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Abstract
We explore the disciplining effect of short selling on overinvestment. Firms with more
stock lending supply have higher abnormal announcement stock returns of acquiring
firms, lower subsequent abnormal capital investments, and longer spells between large
investments, and higher subsequent Tobin’s Q and ROA. Alleviating the endogeneity
concern, our multivariate difference-in-difference analysis shows that this disciplinary
force of lending supply is more effective for firms in the Regulation SHO-PILOT Pro-
gram. We identify two mechanisms through which short selling disciplines managers:
managers’ wealth-performance sensitivity and likelihood of hostile takeovers. Addi-
tionally, the disciplinary force only exists for non-financial-constrained firms and non-
all-cash M&A deals.
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1 Introduction
Since the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission announced short-selling bans during the
2008 financial crisis, the debate regarding the role of short sellers has been revived. On the one
hand, regulators contend that short sellers might harm financial markets by driving stock prices
below their fundamental values and dampen investor confidence.1 On the other hand, a large body
of literature has shown that short sellers are informed traders and that their trading activities
help incorporate firm-specific information into stock prices. For instance, short selling is associated
with negative future stock returns (e.g., Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2005); Bris, Goetzmann, and
Zhu (2007); Chang, Cheng, and Yu (2007); Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2007); Boehmer, Jones,
and Zhang (2008b, 2008a); Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg (2012)), negative earnings surprises
(Christophe, Ferri, and Angel (2004)), and financial misrepresentation (e.g., Desai, Krishnamurthy,
and Venkataraman (2006); Karpoff and Lou (2010)). In addition, Jensen (2005) argues, “Short
sellers are an obvious source of potentially valuable information for the governance system...” How-
ever, little research has been conducted on this potential governance effect of short sellers. This
paper fills this gap in the literature by investigating whether short sellers have a disciplining effect
on overinvestment, which is one of the most severe value-destroying agency problems.2
The intuition that short selling can serve as an external corporate governance mechanism is
as follows. Short sellers have been shown to be able to identify managerial misbehavior and un-
favorable information that is not reflected in stock prices. The downward price pressure resulting
from informed short selling can damage managers’ personal interests through reduced stock-based
compensation or an increased likelihood of a hostile takeover that might cause a loss of job for
the manager.3 As long as managers are concerned with their personal wealth or job security, the
presence of an active short-selling market might deter managers from engaging in value-destroying
1In the order enacting the short-selling restrictions in 2008, the SEC stated that “...is in the public interest and for
the protection of investors to maintain or restore fair and orderly securities markets. This emergency action should
prevent short selling from being used to drive down the share prices of issuers even where there is no fundamental
basis for a price decline...” Two academic studies advocate similar points of view. Goldstein and Guembel (2008)
hypothesize that short sellers might manipulate stock prices, which results in bad managerial investment decisions.
Henry and Koski (2010) show that the levels of pre-issue short selling volume are positively related to abnormal
returns on the SEO announcement date, suggesting that short sellers engage in manipulative trading.
2The literature has shown that managers tend to engage in value-destroying overinvestment for private benefits
(e.g., Jensen (1986); Stulz (1990); Richardson (2006); Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007); Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell
(2008); Billett, Garfinkel, and Jiang (2011)).
3We would present supportive evidence for these two specific mechanisms through which short selling imposes
disciplinary effect on overinvestment in Section 5.
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activities ex ante and thus serves as an external disciplining mechanism on managerial behavior. In
particular, the effectiveness of this disciplining mechanism hinges on the value of shares available
for short sellers to borrow. Short sellers have less incentive to search for weaknesses in firms if they
cannot easily borrow shares to short. Hence, we use the lending supply in the short selling market
to capture the amount of ammunition that short sellers can use to profit from spotting managerial
value-destroying overinvestment. The higher the lending supply, the more severe the potential pun-
ishment (short-selling-induced price drops) managers might face. Relying on this measure, we test
our main hypothesis that short selling has a disciplining effect on overinvestment.
The measures of overinvestment are debatable. Therefore, to test our hypothesis, we employ
three existing measures in the literature to gauge overinvestment. Our first analysis focuses on
mergers and acquisitions, which are larger and more easily observable forms of corporate investments
with valuation implication. Managers have tendency to seek to build larger empires by engaging in
acquisitions even if the deals are value-destroying. The literature has shown that less antitakeover
provisions would mitigate value-destroying mergers and acquisitions (e.g., Masulis et al. (2007)).
We examine a sample of approximately 1,000 completed U.S. domestic mergers and acquisitions
between 2003 and 2012 and find that acquirers with higher lending supply in the previous year
yield higher announcement returns. After controlling for a set of firm and deal characteristics, we
find that a one-standard-deviation increase in lending supply (0.12) corresponds to an increase in
the five-day cumulative abnormal return of 0.592% (using the column (14) of Table 2 estimate),
which is more than two times of the average five-day cumulative abnormal return in our sample.
Second, managers can engage in overinvestment not only through external acquisitions but also
through internal spending. We investigate the disciplining effect of lending supply on abnormal cap-
ital investments, the difference between current capital investment and average capital investment
over the previous three years, which is a measure of overinvestment introduced in Titman, Wei,
and Xie (2004). Controlling for a set of firm-specific variables and year and firm fixed effects, we
find that firms with a higher lending supply have lower subsequent abnormal capital investment. A
one-standard-deviation increase in lending supply (0.14) induces the subsequent abnormal capital
investment to decrease by 55% from the sample mean (using the column (9) of Table 4 estimate,
and evaluated at the average of abnormal capital investment, 0.0565).
Third, we examine whether the disciplining force of short selling affects the frequency of large
investments. Billett et al. (2011) use hazard model estimation, based on Whited (2006), to gauge
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overinvestment by focusing on the frequency of investment spikes (large investments) and the time
between spikes.4 We find that a firm with a higher lending supply demonstrates lower tendency to
overinvest, which is indicated by a lower hazard rate and longer spells between investment spikes.
In particular, we find that a one-standard-deviation increase in lending supply leads to a 20.47%
decrease in the hazard rate (using the column (3) of Table 6 estimate). Collectively, these three
sets of results are consistent with our hypothesis that short selling has a disciplinary effect on
overinvestment.
The results on the announcement returns of acquiring firms have hinted that the disciplining
effect of lending supply on corporate investment decisions is related to firm values. To formally
test this value implication, we propose our second hypothesis that lending supply is positively as-
sociated with firm value in the subsequent year as inefficient investment decision (overinvestment)
is disciplined. Our valuation measure is Tobin’s Q, which is a standard measure employed by
prior corporate governance studies, such as Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny
(1988), Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), and Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009). The results
show that firms with a higher lending supply have higher Tobin’s Q in the subsequent year. A
one-standard-deviation increase in lending supply is associated with an increase in the subsequent
Tobin’s Q of 2.8 percentage point, which represents a 7.26% increase from the mean Tobin’s Q in
our sample (using the column (12) of Table 7 estimate). One may concern that Tobin’s Q proxies
for other firm characteristic, such as growth opportunities, instead of firm value. Therefore, we
also examine the effect of lending supply on firm operating performance, proxied by return on asset
(ROA), and find supportive evidence.
We conduct the following tests to address the potential endogeneity concern that some unob-
served firm characteristics might affect firm investment, value, and lending supply simultaneously.
First, we employ a regulation change in U.S. equity markets, the Regulation SHO-PILOT program.
The price test of short selling (the uptick rules) for a set of randomly selected 1,000 firms in Russell
3000 index was lifted from January 2005 to August 2007. We adopt the multivariate difference-
in-difference methodology in this quasi-natural experiment setup and find that the lending supply
has a stronger disciplining effect for firms that are exempt from the uptick rules compared with the
4Using the hazard model method, Billett et al. (2011) find that firms with more anti-takeover provisions experience
shorter spell lengths between large investments, which suggests that managers at firms with less shareholder governance
engage in overinvestment more frequently. Furthermore, Chang, Lin, and Ma (2012) find that firms with more intensive
institutional trading have a lower hazard of over-investment, which highlights the disciplining effect of institutional
trading on overinvestment.
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remaining Russell 3000 index firms. It is important that our validation is based on the significant
interaction term of lending supply and the difference-in-difference dummy variable because the PI-
LOT difference-in-difference dummy itself may capture various treatment effects on the short selling
activities, volatility, and stock returns that might also affect the corporate investment decisions.5
This result provides coherent evidence that lending supply plays a role in corporate governance,
and its disciplining force is more effective when short selling is less restricted.6 Moreover, we use
the residual term from the lending supply regressing on firm size, book-to-market ratio, firm age,
institutional ownership ratio, and turnover ratio as the main independent variables to tease out
the influence of well-known firm characteristics on our previous findings. We re-estimate all of our
baseline regression models using the residual lending supply, and our main results still hold.
One might also concern that the associations between lending supply, firm value, and corporate
investment are driven by price efficiency induced by realized short interest. Since ex-ante lending
supply is naturally related to ex-post short interest, firms with more lagged lending supply might
have better price efficiency that helps managers to make better corporate investment decisions. This
“feedback explanation” is in the same spirit of Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2007). However, high
short interest also indicates that short sellers may already trade on their negative private informa-
tion regarding firm values. For example, Karpoff and Lou (2010) find that short interest increases
19 months before the revelation of financial misstatement. Hence, to differentiate the governance
effect of lending supply from the feedback effect stemmed from short interest, we incorporate short
interests into our analyses and re-estimate our main tests. We find that short interests are nega-
tively related to the subsequent firm value and operational performance, positively associated with
abnormal capital investment, and positively and insignificantly related to the abnormal returns for
acquiring firms. These results are consistent with Karpoff and Lou’s (2010) mechanism that short
interest contains negative private information regarding firm performance and investment decisions.
Moreover, we find that the effect of lending supply remains after controlling for short interests,
which helps us rule out the alternative feedback effect explanation.
We consider two channels through which lending supply affects managerial behavior: managerial
5For example, Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009) find that pilot stocks have more short sales and higher trade-to-
trade returns’ volatility relative to control stocks. Grullon, Michenaud, and Weston (2012) find that the stock prices
of treated firms decrease relative to the controlling firms.
6We also find that there are no statistically significant changes in lending fees for those treated firms during the
PILOT program compared with the the remaining Russell 3000 index firms. This finding helps us alleviate the concern
that the increases in lending fee during the PILOT program might mitigate the disciplining effect of lending supply
on overinvestment.
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equity-based compensation channel and threat of being a hostile takeover target channel. With
regard to the former channel, we employ the scaled wealth-performance sensitivity (ScaledWPS)
proposed by Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009) to measure the sensitivity of managers’ wealth
to stock price. We argue that if the threat of downward price pressure due to short selling deters
managers from overinvestment, then the effectiveness of the discipline mechanism depends on the
sensitivity of managers’ wealth to stock price. Indeed, we find that the associations between lending
supply and the subsequent overinvestment, Tobin’s Q, and ROA are stronger in firms with higher
ScaledWPS. In addition, we employ the implementation of the accounting standard of FAS 123R,
which requires firms to use the fair value of the stock options in the income statement after June,
2005. Hayes, Lemmon, and Qiu (2012) document that both the usage of option-based compensation
and the pay-performance sensitivity of the CEO’s full portfolio of both current and prior grants of
shares and options decrease significantly after the adoption of FAS 123R. Due to the reduction in
the usage of option-based compensation, managers’ incentives are less aligned with the stock price
(Hall and Liebman (1998) and Hall (1998)). We expect that the governance effect of lending supply
is stronger before the implementation of FAS 123R, and find supportive evidence. These results
suggest that managerial incentive is an important channel through which lending supply disciplines
overinvestment.
With regard to the second channel, we investigate whether the managerial concern of being a
potential hostile takeover target, which might result in job loss, is a mechanism through which short
selling would deter managers from overinvesting. Takeover targets, particularly hostile takeover
targets, often perform poorly before the acquisition announcements and experience substantial
managerial turnover after the completion of acquisitions (Warner, Watts, and Wruck (1988); Martin
and Mcconnell (1991)). We argue that managers might feel a larger threat from short sellers
if they observe occurrence of hostile takeover among their industry peer firms. In other words,
overinvestment might be more effectively disciplined when managerial job security is at stake because
downward price pressure stemmed from short selling leads to a higher likelihood of being the hostile
takeover target. The results are supportive as we find that the negative (positive) association
between lending supply and the subsequent abnormal capital investment (Tobin’s Q and ROA) is
strengthened for firms in an industry that has experienced a hostile takeover.
To substantiate that our previous findings are based upon the disciplining mechanism of lending
supply, we conduct several additional exercises. First, we examine whether the payment method
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of acquisition deals would impact the disciplining effect of lending supply. We find that the effect
on acquisition announcement returns is only significant in non-all-cash-financed acquisitions. This
finding is consistent with the notion that managers tend to engage in value-destroying acquisitions in
stock-financed deals (Shleifer and Vishny (2003); Masulis et al. (2007); Harford, Humphery-Jenner,
and Powell (2012); Fu, Lin, and Officer (2013)), in which the disciplinary effect of lending supply on
managerial behavior would become evident. Next, we use the HP index, as developed by Hadlock
and Pierce (2010), to gauge the extent to which financial constraint levels influence the disciplining
effect of lending supply. Intuitively, managers of financially constrained firms are less likely and
less able to overinvest for their private benefit (Billett et al. (2011)). If the lending supply has a
disciplining effect on overinvestment, it should be more effective for firms with less financial con-
straints (firms with a lower HP index). The results show that the disciplining effect on the abnormal
announcements returns for acquiring firms, and the abnormal capital investment and investment
hazard rate is stronger for firms with a lower HP index (i.e, the bottom tercile). Further, the results
indicate that the positive associations between lending supply and the subsequent Tobin’s Q and
ROA are more pronounced for firms with a low HP index, which is consistent with our expectation.
Finally, we show that the significant and positive associations between LS and subsequent firm value
(operating performance) only exist for firms with subsequent ACI below the median. This result
demonstrates a direct evidence that the disciplinary effect of lending supply can improve the value
of firm and the operating performance of firm through reducing firm’s overinvestment.
Our paper contributes to two burgeoning strands of literature. First, our study complements two
contemporaneous studies of Massa, Zhang, and Zhang (2012) and Fang, Huang, and Karpoff (2013)
in providing evidence regarding the disciplining effect of short selling. Massa et al. (2012) find a
negative relationship between lending supply and earnings manipulation over the 2002 to 2009 period
across 33 countries. Fang et al. (2013) find that discretionary accruals decrease for the treated firms
in the Regulation SHO-PILOT program.7 Unlike these two papers, we focus on overinvestment.
The reason that our paper focuses on overinvestment is that we believe that overinvestment is one of
the most severe value-destroying agency problems.8 In particular, we find that the disciplinary effect
of short selling improves firms value via less sub-optimal investments. On the contrary, whether
earnings management destroys firm value is still an ongoing debate.9 We also identify two potential
7Massa et al. (2012) also find that firms included in the Regulation SHO-PILOT program experience less accrual-
based earnings manipulation from 2005 to 2007.
8The literature shows that overinvestment is value-destroying (e.g., Titman et al. (2004); Masulis et al. (2007);
Billett et al. (2011)).
9Owens, Wu, and Zimmerman (2013) find that rapid changes in business model would result in unrealistically large
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mechanisms to support the disciplinary force of short selling, i.e., managers wealth-performance
sensitivity and likelihood of hostile takeovers. In addition, we interact the dummy variable of being
treated in the Regulation SHO-PILOT program with the lending supply, which directly tests the
disciplinary effect of the lending supply and does not suffer from confounding treatment effects on
other aspects of stocks like short interest. Second, our paper expands the literature on the real
effect of financial markets (e.g., Bond, Edmans, and Goldstein (2011) andEdmans, Goldstein, and
Jiang (2012); Hau and Lai (2012)). We provide evidence that lending market condition may impact
managerial real resources allocation decisions.10
2 Data
We obtain the securities finance data from Markit, which is a research company providing equity
lending data collected from the securities lending desks. This dataset includes firm-level information
regarding lendable inventory, stocks on loan and borrowing rates, covering the period from 2002
to 2011. In addition, we obtain information regarding stock prices, stock returns, and the number
of shares outstanding from the Center for Research in Security Prices. Relevant accounting data
are from COMPUSTAT, and information regarding institutional ownership is from the Thomson-
Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F) Database.
We also obtain acquisitions samples from the U.S. Mergers and Acquisitions database provided
by the Securities Data Corporation (SDC). We impose the following restrictions11: (1) the acquisi-
tion must be completed; (2) the acquiring firms must own less than 50% of the target firms’ shares
before the acquisition and more than 50% of the target firms’ shares after the acquisition; (3) the
deal value disclosed in the SDC database must be more than $1 million and more than 1% of the
market value of the acquiring firm;12 (4) the acquiring firm must have corresponding financial infor-
mation in COMPUSTAT; (5) the acquiring firm must have daily stock return data in CRSP at least
100 days before the announcement; and (6) the acquirer must be able to find matching data in the
lending supply data. The imposition of these restrictions results in a final sample of approximately
1,000 U.S. domestic mergers and acquisitions during the 2003-2012 period.
accruals and biased discretionary accruals, which implies that accruals might not be value-destroying.
10In addition, our empirical evidence suggests that the disciplining effect of short selling relates more to overinvest-
ment than to the “quiet life” hypothesis (Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003)) perhaps because it is easier for short
sellers to spot and target managers at firms exhibiting a tendency to overinvest than who are enjoying the quiet life.
11The application of these filters follows Masulis et al. (2007) and Chen et al. (2014).
12The market value of the acquirer is calculated as (total asset − common equity + common shares outstanding ×
fiscal year end stock price).
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3 Main Empirical Results
3.1 Measure for Disciplinary Effect of Short Selling: Lending Supply
The key variable of interest in this study is the lending supply in the equity finance market, which
captures the disciplinary effect of short selling. Following Saffi and Sigurdsson (2011) and Massa
et al. (2012), we construct the lending supply (LS) as the ratio of the value of shares available
for lending to a firm’s market capitalization. Because abnormal capital investments are calculated
annually, we compute the LS for firm i in year t based on the annual average value of shares available
for lending.13 Table A-1 presents the determinants of LS. Consistent with Saffi and Sigurdsson
(2011), we find that firms with higher book-to-market ratios and liquidity tend to have higher
LS. More importantly, we find that the institutional ownership ratio (IOR) is the most significant
determinant of the value of loanable shares available in the equity lending market, which is intuitive
because the main suppliers in the lending market are ETFs and index funds.14 To show that our
results are not driven by the level of IOR, we control for it in all our tests.
3.2 Three Ways to Gauge Overinvestment
A large literature investigates whether agency problems affect corporate investment. Jensen (1986)
and Stulz (1990) suggest that managers have tendency to spend internal funds on investments that
benefit managerial personal interest but harm that of shareholders when monitoring is imperfect.
One pervasive reason why managers’ interests may not be aligned with those of shareholders is that
managers might have an excessive preference for running larger firms rather than profitable ones,
which results in value-destroying overinvestment.
The existing measures of overinvestment are debatable. Therefore, to test our hypothesis, we
employ three measures to gauge overinvestment: abnormal returns for acquiring firms (Masulis
et al. (2007)), abnormal capital investment (Titman et al. (2004)), and hazard estimation for the
probability of large investments (Billett et al. (2011)). In this way, we could provide a holistic
examination of this issue.
13Because Markit provides weekly data after 2004 and daily data after 2006, we use the average monthly, weekly, or
daily data, as applicable and as available, to estimate the annual average value of shares available for lending, which
is then scaled by firm’s market capitalization.
14DAvolio (2002) also find that institutional ownership is positively associated with loan supply.
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3.2.1 Mergers and Acquisitions Returns
Because acquisitions are large and easily observable corporate investment with value implications,
many empirical studies explore whether good governance would mitigate value-destroying mergers
and acquisitions (e.g., Lewellen, Loderer, and Rosenfeld (1985), Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990),
Masulis et al. (2007), and Chen, Harford, and Lin (2014)). For example, Masulis et al. (2007)
and Chen et al. (2014) find that managers are more likely to initiate acquisitions with lower
abnormal announcement return, when a firm has more anti-takeover provisions and experiences
exogenous decreases in analyst coverage, respectively. We also employ mergers and acquisitions,
and examine whether the disciplinary effect of short selling would mitigate value-destroying mergers
and acquisitions.
In particular, we conduct the following regression model:
CAR(−2, 2)i,t = a0 + a1 × LSi,t−1 + a2 ×Xi,t−1 + ϵi,t (1)
where LSi,t−1 refers to the measure of lending supply for firm i in year t-1. CAR(−2, 2)i,t refers to
the cumulative abnormal return of mergers and acquisitions for firm i in year t and is computed
as the residuals of the market model based on a 5-day event window (-2,2), where day 0 is the
announcement date. We first use the daily stock return during the period of (-210, -11) to estimate
the market model, with the CRSP value-weighted return as the market return. Then, we use the
coefficients derived from this stage to compute the residuals from the market model during the event
window (-2,2). Xi,t−1 includes a set of acquirer- and deal-specific control variables. In particular,
the set of acquirer-specific variables consists of the logarithm of total assets (TotAsset), compounded
daily excess returns over previous year (PastStockReturn), return on asset (ROA), Tobin’s Q, the
ratio of PP&E to sales (FixedAsset), the ratio of R&D to total assets (R&D), non-cash working
capital (NonCashWorking), the ratio of the long term debt to the total assets (Leverage), free
cash flow (FreeCashFlow), and the ratio of institutional investor ownership to the total shares
outstanding (IOR). Deal-specific variables include the ratio of deal value to the market value of the
acquirer’s total assets (RelativeDealSize), a friendly deal attitude dummy variable (FriendlyDeal),
a high-tech dummy variable (High-tech), a tender offer dummy variable (TenderOffer), and a cash
deal dummy variable (CashDeal).15 In addition, we add the E-Index and the G-Index as described
15We follow Chen et al. (2014) in using these control variables.
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in Gompers et al. (2003) and Bebchuk et al. (2009). We include two-digit industry dummies and
year dummies, and we further cluster the standard errors at both firm and year levels, as suggested
in Petersen (2009).
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for mergers and acquisitions sample firms. We find
that the average CAR (-2,2) is 0.20% with a standard deviation of 7.41%. The mean value of LS
is 0.11 with a standard deviation of 0.12. Table 2 reports the regression results of Eq.(1). Across
all specifications, the coefficients for LS are positive and statistically significant, which suggests
that firms with higher LS experience better market responses for their M&A announcements. In
particular, column (14) suggests that a one-standard-deviation increase in LS causes an increase in
the five-day cumulative abnormal return of 0.592%, which is more than two times of the average
five-day cumulative abnormal return in our sample.16 It is noteworthy that after controlling for
the effects of the E-Index or the G-Index, our main findings still hold, although the sample size
decreases. In addition, Masulis et al. (2007) document a strong negative relationship between
acquirers’ anti-takeover provisions and announcement period abnormal stock returns. Our results
show that the E-Index and the G-Index exhibit the expected negative sign on the coefficients,
although insignificant. This set of results implies that when managers face higher potential short
selling, they are less likely to conduct value-destroying mergers and acquisitions for private benefit.
3.2.2 Abnormal Capital Investment
Self-interested managers will engage in overinvestment not only through external acquisitions but
also through internal spending. Harford et al. (2008) use an index of anti-takeover provisions and
insider ownership to gauge the severity of the firms’ agency costs, and find that firms with weaker cor-
porate governance structures would have greater industry-adjusted investment. Richardson (2006)
also finds supportive evidence that firms with good governance structures are less likely to over-
investment. Titman et al. (2004) find that the negative association between the abnormal capital
investment and the consequent abnormal stock return is more prominent when hostile takeovers are
less likely to occur, which is also consistent with the notion that good governance (corporate con-
trol) would mitigate managers’ tendencies to overinvest. We follow Titman et al. (2004) to measure
16Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) find that many arbitrageurs would trade on mergers and acquisition announcement
days by short selling acquirers and buying targets. Their finding could imply a negative correlation between shares
available for M&A arbitrageurs to short and abnormal announcement returns for acquiring firm. However, this
argument is against us finding a positive relation between lending supply and announcement return for acquiring
firms.
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abnormal capital investment as the difference between the current capital investment and average
capital investment over the previous three years, and examine whether high lending supply would
restrain managers’ overinvestment tendency.
We first calculate abnormal capital investment (ACIt) in a given year,
ACIt =
CEt
(CEt−1 + CEt−2 + CEt−3)/3
− 1 (2)
where t represents the year when the ACI is calculated and CEt is firm capital expenditures (Com-
pustat Data Item 128, CAPEX) scaled by the firm’s total assets in year t. Then, we investigate the
effect of lending supply on abnormal capital investment by performing the following regression:
ACIi,t = ai + at + a1 × LSi,t−1 + a2 ×Xi,t−1 + ϵi,t (3)
where ai and at are dummies for firm and year fixed effects, respectively. ACIi,t is calculated
according to Eq.(2). The variable of interest is the coefficient on the LS, a1. Xi,t−1 denotes a
set of control variables, including the ratio of institutional investor ownership to the total shares
outstanding (IOR), total assets (TotAsset), the logarithm of book-to-market ratio (BM), cash flow
(CashFlow), Tobin’s Q, return on asset (ROA), the growth rate of sales (SaleGrowth), the ratio of
the long term debt to the total assets (Leverage), the entrenchment index proposed in Bebchuk et
al. (2009) (E-Index), and the G-Index proposed in Gompers et al. (2003). In addition, we cluster
standard errors at the firm level.
Table 3 provides the sample statistics on these variables for the ACI tests.17 The mean value
of LS is 0.11 with a standard deviation of 0.14, and the mean value of ACI is 0.06 with a stan-
dard deviation of 0.80. We present the estimation results of Eq.(3) regarding the effect of lending
supply on the subsequent abnormal capital investments in Table 4. The dependent variable is the
subsequent ACI, which is computed according to Eq.(2). The key explanatory variable is the LS.
We find that, across all specifications, the coefficients on LS have significantly negative effect on
ACI, which supports the hypothesis that on average managers at firms with more LS are less likely
to overinvest. It is noteworthy that these results remain qualitatively unchanged when we add the
E-Index and the G-Index in the regression (although the sample size decreases dramatically). This
finding indicates that the disciplining effect of lending supply is distinct from the known governance
17In Table 3, we provide the sample statistics for ACI, Tobin’s Q, and ROA tests.
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mechanism of anti-takeover provisions. In addition, this effect is economically significant. For ex-
ample, in specification (9), we find that when lending supply increases by one standard deviation,
the subsequent abnormal capital investment decreases by 56% from the sample mean (evaluated at
the average of abnormal capital investment of 0.0565).
The results of other control variables are also noteworthy. All the coefficients on leverage are
negatively significant, which is consistent with the benefits of debt in alleviating agency costs (e.g.,
Jensen (1986); Titman et al. (2004)). The coefficients on sales growth are positive in all specifications
(though some of them are insignificant), which suggests that managers in firms with good past
performance tend to overinvest (e.g., Morck et al. (1990)). In addition, the coefficients on the
E-Index and the G-Index are positive (although insignificant), which indicates that firms with
poor shareholder governance tend to experience higher abnormal capital investment. Overall, these
results support our main hypothesis and suggest that LS has a disciplining effect on subsequent
overinvestment. This effect remains strong and significant after controlling for a set of firm-specific
variables that have been shown to affect corporate investments.
3.2.3 Hazard Estimation
Whited (2006) develops an empirical methodology based on hazard model estimation to alleviate
concerns on measurement errors and lumpy feature of investments.18 Based on Whited’s (2006)
methodology, Billett et al. (2011) examine the effect of anti-takeover provisions, the Gompers et
al.’s (2003) G-Index, on managers’ tendencies to overinvest. They find that low G-Index firms would
experience longer time (spells) between two large investments, which suggests that good governance
restrains managers from overinvesting.
We use the same setup in Billett et al. (2011) and include lending supply as the main time-
varying covariate to explore whether firms with more lending supply would have higher likelihood
to experience longer time between two large investments. We focus on a subsample of small firms,
as Whited (2006) argues that large firms are more likely to have different business segments, which
might help firms smooth investment. Hence, we define small firms as firms whose total asset value
is lower than the 33rd percentile of the total assets of all firms. Additionally, to capture whether
18Whited (2006) examines whether external finance constraints affect the timing of large investment projects, and
show that firms that are more financially constrained has higher likelihood to experience longer inactive “spells”
between larger investments (“spikes”).
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an investment spike occurs for a firm in a certain year, we define the investment spike utilizing four
different thresholds: 2 or 2.5 times the firm’s own median investment/asset ratio and 2 or 2.5 times
the industry median value of investment/asset ratio for that year.19 We perform the hazard model
estimation as follows:
λi(t) = ωiλ0(t)exp(LSi,t · γ + xi(t)′ · β) (4)
where xi(t) represents a vector of covariates that identifies observable differences across individual
firms and includes two-digit industry dummies, year dummies, the ratio of cash flow to assets,
sales growth, the logarithm of total assets, and the leverage ratio. The variables describing firm
characteristics are calculated between the current and previous spikes. The disciplining effect of
lending supply predicts that the coefficient of LS (γ) should be statistically negative, which would
indicate that a high LS would reduce the hazard rate and extend the duration between large
investments.20
Table 5 reports the summary statistics for the sample firms included in the hazard model estima-
tion. In Panel A, we summarize the mean, median, and standard deviation of firm characteristics,
including the investment/assets ratio, LS, leverage ratio, cash flow, sales growth, and logarithm of
total assets. The average value of the investment/assets is 0.04 with a standard deviation of 0.07.
The mean value of LS is 0.06 with a standard deviation of 0.06. In Panel B, we report the mean,
median, and standard deviation of spell characteristics. In particular, this sample set includes 1,219
spells, and the average spell length between two investment spikes is 3.48 years.
Table 6 presents the results of the hazard model estimation. Columns (1) and (2) show that an
investment spike occurs when firms’ investment rate during the year exceeds 2 or 2.5 times median
value of a firm’s own investment rate. Columns (3) and (4) show that an investment spike occurs
when a firm’s investment rate in this year exceeds 2 or 2.5 times the median value of the industry’s
investment rate. We find that the coefficients for LS are negative and statistically significant.21 For
example, in column (3), we find that a one-standard-deviation increase in LS results in a 20.47%
decrease in the investment hazard rate. In general, these results support our main hypothesis that
LS has a disciplining effect on management. Together with the findings from the previous two
19We require at least three observations by firm for the computation of the firm’s own median investment/asset
ratio or by industry-year for the computation of the industry median value of investment/asset ratio for a certain
year.
20We discuss the detailed procedure of hazard model estimation in Appendix A.
21The coefficients reported in this table are in exponential form. We also include the estimation for the baseline
hazard. However, because we focus on the coefficients for the covariate of LS, the results of the baseline hazard rates
are omitted. We also standardize the LS measure in the hazard estimation tests to make the results readable.
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subsections, our first hypothesis is supported: higher lending supply (i.e., more ammunition for the
short sellers) can effectively deter managers from overinvesting.
3.3 Subsequent Firm Value and Firm Operating Performance
In this section, we test our second hypothesis that LS has a positive impact on firm value and
performance. Our previous results demonstrate that high LS deters managers from undertaking
value-destroying investments, which reduces the agency costs otherwise incurred. We therefore
argue that firms with higher LS experience higher subsequent firm value. Specifically, we perform
the regression as follows:
IndAdj Tobin′sQi,t = ai + at + a1 × LSi,t−1 + a2 ×Xi,t−1 + ϵi,t (5)
where ai and at are dummies for firm and year fixed effects, respectively. LSi,t−1 refers to the
measure of lending supply for firm i in year t-1. Following Gompers et al. (2003), we employ the
industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q to measure firm value. In particular, IndAdj Tobin′sQ refers to the
ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets, in which the market value of assets
is defined as the difference between the sum of the book value of assets and the market value of
common stock and the sum of the book value of the common stock and balance sheet-deferred
taxes. It is adjusted for the median Tobin’s Q in the same year and in the same two-digit industry
classification.22
The set of control variables, Xi,t−1, includes the following: the ratio of institutional investor
ownership to the total shares outstanding (IOR), the logarithm of the market capitalization (SIZE),
the logarithm of sales (Sale), the ratio of the long term debt to the total assets (Leverage), cash
flow (CashFlow), the firm’s age (AGE), the ratio of the dividends paid to the book value of equity
(Dividend), the ratio of R&D to total assets (R&D),23 the ratio of PP&E to sales (FixedAsset),
the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets (Capx), the logarithm of cash (Cash), the fraction
of shares held by insiders (such as the CEO, CFO, COO, and the president) to the total shares
outstanding (InsiderOwn), the square of InsiderOwn (InsiderOwn2), and the ratio of net income to
the book value of equity (ROE).24 In addition, we add the E-Index and the G-Index as described
22We require at least 5 Tobin’s Qs in an industry classification in the same year.
23We set Dividend and R&D to zero when a firm does not report the dividend and R&D data.
24The construction of the set of control variables is largely based on Kim and Lu (2011).
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in Gompers et al. (2003) and Bebchuk et al. (2009). These two papers document that both the
G-Index and E-Index are related to firm value. Thus, we include these two variables to control for
the potential disciplining effect stemming from anti-takeover provisions. In all specifications, we
cluster standard errors at the firm level.
Table 7 presents the estimates for the regression model in Eq.(5). We find a significantly positive
correlation between lending supply (LS) and subsequent firm value across all specifications. In
column (12), a one-standard-deviation increase in LS corresponds to an increase in the subsequent
firm value of 2.8%, which represents an 7.26% increase from the mean industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q
in our sample. Although the sample size decreases radically, the governance effect of LS remains
significant after adding the E-Index or the G-Index, as shown in columns (13) and (14). It is also
noteworthy that most of the coefficients on Capx are significantly negative, which suggests a negative
relationship between a firm’s capital investments and subsequent firm value and is consistent with
the notion that over-investment can destroy a firm’s future value.
In addition, we employ ROA to examine the effect of lending supply on firm’s operational
performance. Following Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam (2009), we conduct the regression as
follows:
IndAdj ROAi,t = ai + at + a1 × LSi,t−1 + a2 ×Xi,t−1 + ϵi,t (6)
where ai, at are dummies for firm and year fixed effects, respectively. LSi,t−1 refers to the lending
supply for firm i in year t-1. IndAdj ROA refers to the ratio of net income to the total assets
and is industry adjusted by subtracting the median ROA in the corresponding two-digit industry
classification in the same year.25 The set of control variables, Xi,t−1, includes the following: the
logarithm of book-to-market ratio (BM), the ratio of the institutional investors ownership to the
total shares outstanding (IOR), the logarithm of market capitalization (SIZE), the ratio of capital
expenditures to total assets (Capx), the ratio of the long term debt to the total assets (Leverage),
the ratio of dividends paid to the book value of equity (Dividend). We also include the lagged
ROA to account for serial dependence in the variable. In addition, we include the E-Index and the
G-Index to control for the potential disciplining effect resulting from anti-takeover provisions. In
all specifications, we cluster standard errors at the firm level.
Table 8 presents the regression results of Eq.(6). The results show a significantly positive
25We also require at least 5 ROAs in an industry classification in the same year.
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association between lending supply (LS) and subsequent firm operating performance. The results
in column (7) show that an increase in lending supply by one standard deviation (i.e., an increase
of 0.1420) would cause an increase in the subsequent ROA by 0.23%, i.e., 1.10% standard deviation
of the subsequent ROA. Although the sample size decreases radically, the governance effect of LS
remains significant after adding the E-Index and G-Index, as shown in columns (8) and (9).
Overall, these results suggest that firms with a higher lending supply experience higher firm
value and better operating performance in the following year, which is consistent with our second
hypothesis.
4 Addressing Endogeneity Issue and Alternative Explanation
Major lenders in the short selling market are ETFs or index funds. These funds are by na-
ture passive investors and unlikely to study a particular company when there could be hundreds
constituent stocks in the index. Further, tracking error would be large if fund outweights or under-
weights a stock too much relative to index weight. Thus, our previous findings are less likely to be
driven by the channel of the suppliers on the lending market. However, we conduct the following
exercises to mitigate the endogeneity concern and alternative explanations.
4.1 PILOT Program
To address the potential endogeneity issue, we focus on a regulatory change in the U.S. equity
markets, the Regulation SHO PILOT program (2005-2007), which eliminates the price tests for
short selling with respect to a set of randomly selected firms from Russell 3000 Index. Regulation
SHO was announced by the SEC in 2004. Under this regulation approximately 1,000 treated firms
are randomly selected from Russell 3000 Index and their price restrictions for short selling (uptick
rules) are lifted during the period from January 3, 2005 to August 6, 2007.26 There are several
contemporaneous studies that investigate the treatment effect of the PILOT program, Treated ×
PILOT , on firms’ earnings management, capital investment level, and innovations (e.g., Grullon et
al. (2012); Massa et al. (2012); Fang et al. (2013); He and Tian (2014)). Unlike these papers, we are
interested in the three-way interaction term, LSi,t−1 × Treated × PILOT , as the pure treatment
effect of PILOT program is difficult to interpret due to the fact that many other stock market
conditions are affected by the removal of the price tests. For example, Diether et al. (2009) find
26For the details of the Regulation SHO PILOT program, see also Diether et al. (2009).
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that treated stocks have more short sales and higher trade-to-trade returns’ volatility relative to
control stocks. By focusing on the interaction term of LSi,t−1 × Treated × PILOT , we are able
to examine whether lifting the price restriction for short selling enhances the governance effect of
lending supply on overinvestment because lower short sale constraints impose a greater threat to
managers.27 In particular, we perform the following regression models:
DVi,t = at + a1 × LSi,t−1 + a2 × LSi,t−1 × Treated× PILOT + a3 × LSi,t−1 × Treated+
a4 × LSi,t−1 × PILOT + a5 × Treated× PILOT + a6 × PILOT + a7 ×Xi,t−1 + ϵi,t
(7)
where at is dummy for year fixed effects. DVi,t is the dependent variable that includes CAR(−2, 2)i,t,
ACIi,t, IndAdj Tobin
′sQi,t and IndAdj ROAi,t, respectively. CAR(−2, 2)i,t is the 5-day cumula-
tive abnormal stock returns of acquiring firms for mergers and acquisition announcements in the
subsequent year. ACIi,t is calculated according to Eq.(2). IndAdj Tobin
′sQi,t and IndAdj ROAi,t
are computed according to the procedure in Section 4.3. Treated is a dummy variable that equals
one for firms that are selected as Regulation SHO treated stock, and zero for the remaining Russell
3000 Index members.28 PILOT is a time dummy variable that equals one from 2005 to 2007 and
zero from 2002 to 2004. Xi,t−1 denotes a set of control variables that are same as that in column
(14) of Table 2, column (9) of Table 4, column (12) of Table 7 and column (7) of Table 8. In
this test, our sample period runs from 2002 until the end of the PILOT program (2007). We do
not control for firm-fixed effects owing to a collinearity with Treated dummy. Standard errors are
two-way clustered by both firm and year (Petersen (2009)).
Our main variable of interest is the coefficient on the three-way interaction term, a2, which shows
how lifting the price restriction for short selling affects the disciplinary effect of lending supply (LS)
on subsequent abnormal corporate investment, firm values, and operating performances. Table 9
shows that the coefficient on the three-way interaction term, a2, is significantly positive in columns
(1), (3) and (4), and significantly negative in column (2).29 These findings suggest that lifting the
price restrictions for short selling reinforces the disciplinary effect of lending supply on subsequent
overinvestment and increases firm values and firm performance accordingly.
27Grullon et al. (2012) find that on average investment falls for treated firms due to lower stock price during PILOT
program. This effect is captured by the Treated × PILOT dummy variable. Therefore, our results based on the
three-way interaction term, LSi,t−1 × Treated × PILOT , directly reflect whether the disciplining effect of lending
supply is strengthened when it becomes easier to short sell.
28Because the SEC issued the list of stocks on July 28, 2004, we therefore employ the list of Russell 3000 Index
members on June, 2004. We also thank Russell Investments for providing the list of Russell 3000 index.
29For the ease of the readability, we do not report regression coefficients on control variables in Tables 9, 10, 12, 13,
15, and A-3. The complete tables are presented in Internet Appendix, which is available upon request.
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One may concern that lifting the price restrictions for short selling will lead to an increase in
lending fees for treated stocks, which would then increase the trading cost for short sellers. This
means that Regulation SHO might not effectively lower the short selling constraints for treated
firms. We therefore conduct multivariate difference-in-differences (DiD) test to examine the effects
of Regulation SHO on lending fees for short selling. We present the results in Table A-4. The
coefficient for PILOT × Treated is the DiD estimate that indicates whether lending fees increase
for treated stocks during the PILOT program period. We report the simple OLS results in column
(1) and control for both year and firm fixed effects in column (2). We find that the coefficients for
PILOT ×Treated are statistically insignificant and positive in columns (1) and (2), which suggests
that the change in lending fees for treated firms during the PILOT program is not significantly
different from that of the control stocks. These findings help to alleviate the concern that the
increase in lending fees during the PILOT program might mitigate the disciplinary effect of short
selling on overinvestment. Overall, the results in this subsection assure us that our prior findings
are not driven by potential endogeneity or omitted variable issues.
4.2 Residual of Lending Supply
In addition to the quasi-natural experiment of the PILOT program, we use the residual LS to
validate our arguments. Because Saffi and Sigurdsson (2011) show that lending supply is closely
related to firm size, book-to-market ratio, and turnover ratio, we estimate the residual term of
LS by regressing on firm size, book-to-market ratio, firm age, institutional ownership ratio, and
turnover ratio with controlling for firm and year fixed effects.30 Because our measure of residual
LS is orthogonal to these firm characteristics by construction, we argue that our previous findings
do not merely reflect the effects of the firm characteristics that are known to be associated with
investments and firm values.
We use residual LS to re-estimate our major regression models, namely column (14) of Table
2, column (9) of Table 4, column (12) of Table 7 and column (7) of Table 8. We present these
results in Table 10. In column (1) of Table 10, we find that the coefficient on the residual LS is
0.048 at a 10% significance level, which suggests that the disciplinary effect of lending supply on
value-destroying mergers and acquisitions is robust to the use of residual LS. In column (2) of Table
30The literature has shown that institutional ownership and equity returns are related. Therefore, we add IOR to
ensure that our results are not driven by effects from institutional investors (Gompers and Metrick (2001); Yan and
Zhang (2009)).
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10, we find that the negative relationship between LS and the subsequent ACI still holds when we
use the residual LS measure. In columns (3) and (4) of Table 10, we find a positive and significant
relationship between the residual LS and subsequent Tobin’s Q and ROA, which indicates that
the positive associations between lending supply and subsequent firm value and firm performance
are robust to using residual LS to control for possible endogeneity and many firm characteristics.
Overall, the results suggest that our main findings are robust in their support for our hypothesis
that lending supply has a disciplining effect on managerial misbehavior, i.e. overinvestment.
4.3 Rulling Out Alternative Explanation
One may concern that the associations between lending supply, firm value, and corporate investment
are driven by realized short interest. The literature on the real effect of the stock market indicates
that managers can learn valuable information from stock prices, and use this information to make
better decisions (e.g., Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2007)). It is natural that higher ex-ante lending
supply accompanies with high ex-post short interest, which leads to greater price efficiency and
incorporates more private information.31 This information could for instance help managers to
investment more efficiently and lead to a better firm value. However, high short interest also
indicates that negative private information related to firm value and managerial investment decision
is revealed in lending market. For example, Karpoff and Lou (2010) show that short interest
increases 19 months before financial misstatement. Therefore, it is important to examine whether
our previous findings are driven by the impact of short interests.
To empirically rule out the effect of short interest on firm performance and managerial invest-
ment decisions, we use short interest as our main independent variable and re-estimate our main
tests. We present the results in columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) of Table 11. We find that short
interests are negatively related to the subsequent firm value and operational performance, posi-
tively associated with abnormal capital investment, and positively and insignificantly related to
the abnormal returns for acquiring firms. These results suggest that our findings are consistent
with Karpoff and Lou’s (2010) mechanism that short interest contains negative private information
regarding firm performance and investment decisions. Further, we control for the effect of short
interest and examine whether the governance effect of lending supply remains. Columns (2), (4),
31In our sample, we find that the correlation between lending supply and short interest varies from 47.18% to
68.96%.
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(6), and (8) of Table 11 present the results. We find that the effect of lending supply remains after
controlling for short interests, which helps us to rule out the alternative story that it is because
of the private information of short interest that helps managers to learn from the stock price and
invest more efficiently.
5 Channels Through Which Short Selling Disciplines
In this section, we provide additional analyses of the channels through which stock lending
supply restrains overinvestment. We focus on scaled managerial wealth-performance sensitivity and
peer firms with another firm in the same industry being the subject of a hostile takeover attempt.
5.1 Wealth Performance Sensitivity
In this subsection, we examine whether the sensitivity of managers’ wealth to stock price is a
potential channel through which the short selling disciplines overinvestment. The rationale is as
follows: if it is the short seller-induced stock price drop that deters managers from overinvesting,
the efficiency of this mechanism depends substantially on the extent to which managers’ wealth is
linked to the stock price of the firm. Edmans et al. (2009) propose the scaled wealth-performance
sensitivity (ScaledWPS), which captures a CEO’s incentives not only from his compensation flows,
such as new grants of stock options, but also from his existing shares and options. We adopt this
measure to gauge the sensitivity of managers’ wealth to the stock performance.32 We expect the
disciplinary effect of short selling to be more pronounced for firms with high ScaledWPS. To test
this expectation, we partition the entire sample into three groups equally based on ScaledWPS and
re-estimate our basic regression specifications in Tables 2, 4, 6, 7, and 8.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 12 show that the positive association between the lending supply
and the acquiring firms’ announcement period abnormal stock returns appears to only be significant
in the top tercile ScaledWPS subsample. These results suggest that when managers’ wealth is more
closely linked with stock price, the disciplinary mechanism of lending supply is more effective in
terms of deterring managers from conducting value-destroying acquisitions.
In columns (3) and (4) of Table 12, we re-estimate specification (9) of Table 4 on subsamples
of firms partitioned by ScaledWPS. Column (3) shows that when firms’ ScaledWPS is in the top
32ScaledWPS represents the dollar change in CEO wealth for a 100% change in firm value, scaled by annual flow
compensation.
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tercile of the sample, the coefficient estimates for LS is -0.4448 (t-statistics=2.06). In contrast, the
coefficient estimate for LS is -0.2347 (t-statistics=1.50) for firms with bottom tercile ScaledWPS.
Next, we focus our analysis of the effect of lending supply on the firm value. Columns (5) and
(6) of Table 12 include the results of the sample with ScaledWPS in the top and bottom tercile,
respectively. We find that the coefficient on the LS in the top tercile is 0.55 at a 10% significance
level, which is 3 times higher the value of the sample as a whole.33 The coefficient on the subsample
with ScaledWPS in the bottom tercile is insignificant, which provides supportive evidence that the
disciplinary effect of LS on overinvestment is more pronounced when firms’ ScaledWPS is high. We
present the ScaledWPS subsample results for firm operating performance (ROA) in columns (7)
and (8) of Table 12. Similarly, we find that the effect of LS is significantly positive in firms with
ScaledWPS in the top tercile. In contrast, the coefficient on LS in the lowest tercile subgroup is
insignificant.
Finally, the subsample results of the hazard model estimation are presented in columns (1) and
(2) of Table A-2. In the high ScaledWPS subsample, the coefficient of LS is -1.48 with a t-value of
3.24, whereas the coefficient of LS in the low ScaledWPS subsample is insignificant (although with
the right sign). Overall, these results confirm our expectation that the governance effect of short
selling is largely driven by firms with higher managerial wealth sensitivity to stock price.
In addition, we employ the change in the accounting standards regarding the way to expense
option-based compensation, the issuance of FAS 123R by Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB), to capture the exogenous changes in the usage of option-based compensation. In 2004,
the FASB issued FAS 123R, which is a revised version of FAS 123.34 FAS 123R requires firms to
use the fair value of the stock options in the income statement, and is effective after June, 2005.
Evidently, the adoption of FAS 123R would increase firms’ accounting costs to issue option-based
compensation. Hayes et al. (2012) document that firms care about the accounting costs of stock
options and dramatically reduce their usage of stock options after the implementation of FAS 123R.
Therefore, we exploit the adoption of FAS 123R as another measure for managerial incentive. Due
to less usage of option-based compensation, managers’ incentives are less aligned with to the stock
33A lower significance level in this test might be due to a decrease in sample size from merging with the ScaledWPS
dataset.
34Although FAS 123 (issued in 1995) has encouraged firms to measure the compensation costs based on the fair
value, i.e., the Black-Scholes value of the option, the statement still allows firms to record compensation expense
using intrinsic value and disclose the fair value in the footnote. Therefore, before 2005, firms are allowed to decide
the method to expense stock options, and many firms were using the intrinsic value method (the market price of the
stock minus the exercise price of the option).
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price performance (Hall and Liebman (1998) and Hall (1998)).35 We expect a stronger governance
effect of lending supply before the implementation of FAS 123R.
We display the results in Table A-3. In this test, we focus on the period from 2002 to 2008
surrounding the adoption of FAS 123R. Pre-123R is a dummy variable that equals one from 2002
to 2004, and zero for time during 2006 to 2008. We exclude the year of 2005, as this year is when
FAS 123R was issued by the FASB. In column (2), we focus on the 5-day abnormal returns for
mergers and acquisition announcements, and find the interaction term LS and Pre-123R exhibits
the expected positive and significant sign on the coefficient. In column (4), we find the coefficient
on the interaction term between LS and Pre-123R is negative and significant, which suggests that
the disciplining effect of short selling on the abnormal capital investments is stronger before the
adoption of 123R. In columns (5) and (6), we focus on firms value (Tobin’s Q), and find that the
coefficient on the interaction term of LS×Pre-123R has the right positive sign though insignificant,
which is consistent with our prediction. In columsn (7) and (8), we focus on operating performance
(ROA), and find that the coefficients on the interaction term of LS×Pre-123R are positive with a
5% significance level, suggesting the positive relation between LS and ROA is stronger before the
implementation of FAS 123R.
5.2 Industry Peers of Hostile Takeover Attempt
In this subsection, we explore whether the managerial concern of being a potential target of hostile
takeover, which might result in job loss, is a potential channel through which short selling restrains
managers from overinvestment. In particular, we focus on firms whose industry peer has been
targeted in a hostile takeover attempt. The literature has shown that hostile takeover targets have
poor performance before the acquisition announcement, and would experience significant managerial
turnover (job loss) after the acquisition announcement (Warner et al. (1988); Martin and Mcconnell
(1991)). We argue that if one firm in a particular industry experienced a hostile takeover attempt,
then overinvestment at firms in the same industry would be more effectively disciplined by short
seller. The intuition is that after the hostile takeover attempt, managers might be more afraid of
the short seller-induced stock price drop because they are concerned the increased likelihood to be
35Hayes et al. (2012) also find that the pay-performance sensitivity of the CEO’s full portfolio of both current and
prior grants of shares and options decreases significantly after the adoption of FAS 123R. Based on Alex Edmans’s
data set, we also find that ScaledWPS decreases significantly after the implementation of FAS 123R.
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the hostile takeover targets.36 Thus, we expect that a hostile takeover attempt will reinforce the
disciplinary effect of lending supply for other firms in the same industry. To explore this prediction,
we conduct the regression models as follows:
DVi,t = ai + at + a1 × LSi,t−1 + a2 × LSi,t−1 × PHT + a3 × PHT + a4 ×Xi,t−1 + ϵi,t (8)
where ai, at are dummies for firm and year fixed effects, respectively. DVi,t is the dependent variable
that includes ACIi,t, IndAdj Tobin
′sQi,t, IndAdj ROAi,t. ACIi,t is calculated according to Eq.(2).
IndAdj Tobin′sQ refers to the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets, in
which the market value of assets is defined as the difference between the sum of the book value
of assets and the market value of common stock and the sum of the book value of the common
stock and balance sheet-deferred taxes. It is adjusted for the median Tobin’s Q in the same year
and in the same two-digit industry classification. IndAdj ROA refers to the ratio of net income
to the total assets and is industry adjusted by subtracting the median ROA in the corresponding
two-digit industry classification in the same year.37 LSi,t−1 refers to the lending supply for firm i in
year t-1. PHT is a dummy variable which equals one if the firm is in an industry (12 Fama-French
industries) that has experienced at least one hostile takeover attempt over last two years. The
variable of interest is the coefficient on the interaction term of LS×PHT, a2. Xi,t−1 denotes a set
of control variables. For the ACI regression, the set of control variable is same to the specification
9 of Table 4. For IndAdj Tobin′sQ (IndAdj ROA) regression, the set of control variable is same
to the specification 12 (7) of Table 7 (8). We also control for both firm and year fixed effects, and
cluster standard errors at the firm level.
Columns (1), (3), and (5) of Table 13 show the estimates for the basic regressions. The coef-
ficients on LS×PHT, a2, are reported in columns (2), (4), and (6) of Table 13. We find that a2
is negative (positive) and significant in column (2) ((4) and (6)). These results demonstrate that
the negative (positive) association between LS and the subsequent ACI (Tobin’s Q and ROA) is
strengthened when another firm in the industry has been the target of a hostile takeover attempt.
This is consistent with our prediction: a hostile takeover for one firm in a particular industry will
reinforce the disciplinary effect of lending supply for other firms in the same industry.
36The literature has also shown that hostile takeover attempt has important spillover effects for the other firms in
the same industry. In particular, those industry peer firms would respond to control threats by altering investment
and financing decisions (Servaes and Tamayo (2013)).
37After merging with the dataset of the abnormal returns for the acquiring firm, the number of observations drops
dramatically, we therefore do not include this set of test.
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6 Additional Supporting Evidence
In this section, we provide further supporting evidence to attribute our earlier findings to the
disciplining effect of short selling on managerial decisions. In particular, we focus on the payment
method for acquisition and the severity of firms financial constraints.
6.1 Payment Method of Acquisition
Fu et al. (2013) find that the stock prices of stock-financed bidders are more over-valued than
those of cash-financed bidders, and cash-financed deals do not generate average negative cumulative
abnormal returns during the announcement period. These results are consistent with the argument
in Jensen (2005) that value-destroying acquisitions driven by over-valued stock prices might reflect
the agency costs associated with stock over-valuation. In this subsection, we divide the mergers
and acquisitions sample into two subsamples based on whether the method of the deal payment
is 100% cash, according to the SDC database. We expect that the disciplining effect of LS plays
a less important role when acquirers use an all-cash method to pay because lower agency costs
are associated with cash-financed acquisitions. Columns (1), (2), and (3) in Table 14 present the
results. In column (3), we only include acquisitions using all cash as the payment. Column (2)
refers to the rest of the deals that use at least some stock as payment method. We find that the
positive association between LS and CAR(-2,2) only exists in non-all-cash deals. In particular, a one-
standard-deviation increase in LS results in an increase in the five-day abnormal stock announcement
returns of acquiring firms of 1.57%, which is almost three times as much as that of column (1)
(the entire sample). This finding suggests that the disciplining effect of lending supply is more
prominent in stock-financed acquisitions, through which managers are more likely to take advantage
of overvalued stocks to engage in value-destroying acquisitions.
6.2 Financial Constraints
In this subsection, we examine how financial constraints affect the disciplining effect of lending
supply. It is intuitive that managers at non-financially-constrained firms are more likely to overinvest
because they have more resources to exploit. Therefore, we expect that the disciplinary effect
of lending supply on overinvestment would be stronger for less financially constrained firms that
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are more vulnerable to this type of agency problem. In particular, we employ the HP Index,
as introduced in Hadlock and Pierce (2010), to gauge the extent to which a firm is financially
constrained.38 We compute the HP index as follows:
HPi,t = −0.727× Sizei,t − 0.043× Size2i,t − 0.040×Agei,t (9)
where Size equals the logarithm of the total assets and Age is the number of years since the first
date that the company’s total assets data appeared in COMPUSTAT. Following the literature, we
winsorize Size at the (logarithm of) $4.5 billion and winsorize Age at thirty-five years. The higher
the HP Index is, the more financially constrained the firm is because young and small firms are
more likely to be financially constrained.
With respect to the tests of the abnormal announcement stock returns for acquiring firms,
we re-estimate the specification of column (14) in Table 2. We display the results regarding the
subsamples of firms partitioned by HP index in columns (1) and (2). In column (2), we find that the
coefficient on LS for firms in the bottom tercile is 0.13 at a 1% significance level, which is almost two
times greater than that in column (14) of Table 2 (the baseline regression for M&A tests). Next, we
focus on the tests of abnormal capital investment, and re-estimate the specification of column (9)
of Table 4. We display the results of subsamples of firms partitioned by HP index value in columns
(3) and (4) of Table 15. Focusing on the result in column (4), which includes firms with an HP
Index value in the bottom tercile, the coefficient for LS is -0.36 at a 1% significance level, which is
almost two times greater than that in column (9) of Table 4 (the baseline regression for ACI test).
These results confirm our expectation that the disciplining effect of short selling on overinvestment
is largely driven by firms with fewer financial constraints.
We further investigate the relationship between LS and the subsequent Tobin’s Q and ROA in
different HP Index groups. Column (6) of Table 15 shows that the coefficient for LS is 0.26 with
t-statistics of 3.00, indicating the positive association between LS and Tobin’s Q is significant at
the 1% level for the subgroup with an HP index value in the bottom tercile of the sample (less
financially constrained). In contrast, the effect of LS on the subsequent firm value is insignificant
for firms with an HP Index in the top tercile of the sample. In columns (7) and (8) of Table 15, our
results show that the coefficient on LS is significantly positive for firms with an HP Index in the
38Hadlock and Pierce (2010) find that firm size and age are useful predictors of firms’ financial constraints and
propose the measure of HP index accordingly.
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bottom tercile of the sample. In contrast, the effect of LS on subsequent firm operating performance
is insignificant for the subgroup with an HP Index in the top tercile of the sample.
In the hazard model estimation, we divide our sample into three subsamples of firms partitioned
by HP index value and test whether the hazard rate is higher in firms with a low HP index. Columns
(3) and (4) in Table A-2 present the results. For the low HP subsample, the coefficient on LS is -2.00
with a t-statistics of 4.90, whereas the coefficient on LS in the high HP subsample is insignificant
(although with the right sign). This result suggests that firms with fewer financial constraints (low
HP group) would be more likely to experience more frequent large investments. In general, these
findings provide additional support for our hypothesis and reinforce the disciplinary interpretation
of our results.
6.3 LS improves Tobin’s Q and ROA through disciplining overinvestment
Although our results about the positive association between lending supply and announcement
returns for acquiring firms suggest that the disciplining effect of lending supply on overinvestment
results in high firm value, we extend our analysis to abnormal capital investment tests. We examine
whether firm value and operating performance are improved by those firms that have lower abnormal
capital investments in the subsequent year. We split our sample into two subsamples, above and
below the median of the subsequent ACI value, and re-run the main regressions of Tobin’s Q and
ROA. We present the results in Table A-5.
In columns (1) and (2), we use the subsequent Tobin’s Q as dependent variable. We find that
the positive association between LS and Tobin’s Q is only statistically significant for firms that
have ACI below the median. Similarly, when we use the subsequent ROA as dependent variable
(columns (3) and (4)), we find that the positive and significant relation between LS and ROA only
exists in subsample where firms have lower ACI (below the median) in the subsequent year. The fact
that firms with below-median ACI have significant and positive association between LS and firm
value (operating performance) demonstrates a direct evidence that the disciplinary effect of lending
supply can improve the value of firm and the operating performance of firm through reducing firm’s
overinvestment.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the disciplinary effect of lending supply in the equity finance market
with respect to deterring managers from conducting overinvestment. Employing lending supply
data from 2002 to 2011, we document a positive association between the lending supply and the
mergers and acquisitions announcement returns of acquiring firms, which suggests that a higher
level of lending supply also deters managers from conducting value-destroying acquisitions. We also
find that firms with a higher lending supply are less likely to experience abnormal capital investment
in the subsequent year. In addition, we find that firms with a higher lending supply have a low
hazard rate and long spells between two adjacent investment spikes. Furthermore, we document a
positive relationship between lending supply and subsequent firm value, proxided by Tobin’s Q. We
find that firms with a higher lending supply experience higher operating performance, proxided by
ROA, in the following year. Firm value and operating performance improve because the effective
threat of short selling discourages managers from engaging in overinvestment.
To mitigate endogeneity concerns, we employ SEC Regulation SHO, which eliminates the price
restriction of short selling for a set of randomly selected firms. The multivariate difference-in-
difference results indicate that the lending supply has a stronger discipline effect for firms that are
exempted from short selling price restrictions. This result provides coherent evidence that short
selling plays a role in corporate governance, and its disciplinary force is more effective when shorting
is less restricted. In addition, we use the residual LS regressing on firm size, book-to-market ratio,
firm age, institutional ownership ratio and turnover ratio as an alternative measure of short selling
disciplinary force and find that our main results still hold. This result indicates that our findings are
robust to controlling for those firm characteristics and support our hypothesis that lending supply
has a disciplining effect on overinvestment. Moreover, our results hold when we control for the short
interest which helps to rule out the alternative explanation of “feedback effect.”
Importantly, we identify two channels through which short selling disciplines managerial behav-
ior. We find that the disciplinary effect is more prominent for firms with high managers’ wealth-
performance sensitivity (ScaledWPS) but is insignificant for firms with low ScaledWPS. Because
the effectiveness of the lending supply largely depends on the sensitivity of managers’ wealth to
stock price, this result helps attribute our findings to the disciplining effect of short selling on man-
agerial misbehavior. Further, we find that the lending supply would discipline overinvestment more
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effectively for firms in the industry in which a hostile takeover occurred. This result shows that
the effectiveness of the disciplinary force of short selling depends on to what extent managers are
worried about their job security, which reinforces our disciplinary interpretation.
In addition, we find that the disciplinary effect is stronger for stock-financed mergers and ac-
quisition deals and for firms with fewer financial constraints. These results indicate that managers
tend to conduct value-destroying overinvestment via stock-financed acquisition deals and in less fi-
nancially constrained firms in which the disciplining effect of lending supply on managerial behavior
would manifest.
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Appendix A: Hazard Model Estimation for Corporate Investment
This appendix describes the methodology for estimating a hazard model of corporate investment. We adopt and follow
the approach of Whited (2006). Specifically, following Meyer (1990), Whited (2006) uses nonparametric specifications,
including unobservable heterogeneity and time-varying explanatory variables and defines the proportional hazard form
as follows:
λi(t) = ωiλ0(t)exp(xi(t)
′β) (A.1)
A hazard model contains two parts. The first part, denoted as λ0(t), is the baseline hazard function, which is a function
of time duration. The second part is exp(xi(t)
′β), which is a function of explanatory variables. xi(t) represents a
vector of covariates that identifies observable differences across individual firms. β is the vector of coefficients of
those covariates, which allows the hazard rates to move upward or downward according to different covariate values.
t represents the length of a spell, i.e., the duration between two investment spikes. ωi is a random variable and
represents unobservable heterogeneity; it is assumed to follow a Gamma distribution with unit mean and variance,
σ2.39
The maximum likelihood method is employed to estimate the coefficients. Denote Ti as the actual length of time
between investment spikes and the censoring time as Ci for firm i. Define δi = 1 if Ti ≤ Ci and 0 otherwise. Let
hi = min(Ti, Ci). The log-likelihood function is as follows:
L(γ, β) =
N∑
i=1
ln{[1 + σ2
hi−1∑
t=0
exp(xi(t)
′β + γ(t))]−1/σ
2 − δi[1 + σ2
hi∑
t=0
exp(xi(t)
′β + γ(t))]−(1/σ
2) (A.2)
where
γ(t) = ln(
∫ t+1
t
λ0(s)ds) (A.3)
and σ represents the variance of the gamma distribution. The estimation method selects the shape of the hazard to
maximize the likelihood of observed durations in the sample.
39The hazard model method also allows for right censoring data. For example, if a firm experiences an investment
spike in 2003 and the firm’s data ended in 2006, then the length of the firm’s final spell would be censored to three
years.
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Appendix B: Variable Definitions
Lending Supply (LS) The ratio of the value of shares available for lending to the firm market capitalization.
ACI The difference between the current year’s capital investment and the average levels of capital invest-
ment measured over the last three years (Eq.(2)).
IndAdj Tobin’s Q The ratio of the market value of assets and the book value of assets, in which the market value of
assets is defined as the difference between the sum of the book value of assets and the market value of
common stock and the sum of the book value of common stock and balance sheet-deferred taxes. It
is also adjusted for the median Q in the same year and in the same two-digit industry classification.
IndAdj ROA The ratio of net income to the total assets, and subtracting the median ROA in the same year and
in the same two-digit industry classification.
IOR The ratio of the institutional investors ownership to total shares outstanding.
TotAsset The logarithm of total assets.
Leverage The ratio of the long term debt to total assets.
ROA The ratio of net income to total assets.
Tobin’s Q The ratio of market value of assets to the book value of assets. (Market value of assets is defined as
the difference between the sum of the book value of assets and the market value of common stock
and the sum of the book value of common stock and balance sheet-deferred taxes.)
BM The logarithm of the ratio of the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity.
SaleGrowth The changes in sales scaled by lagged sales.
CashFlow The sum of income before extraordinary items and depreciation and amortization, scaled by total
assets.
R&D The ratio of R&D expenditure and total assets.
FixedAsset The ratio of property, plant, and equipment (PP&E) to sales.
Dividend The ratio of dividends paid to the book value of equity.
Sale The logarithm of sales.
AGE Derived from the first date of the company total assets data appeared in COMPUSTAT (in loga-
rithm).
Capx The ratio of capital expenditure to total assets.
Cash The logarithm of cash.
Turnover The ratio of the annual trading volume to total shares outstanding.
PastRet The logarithm of compound monthly stock returns in the previous year.
Lending fee The value weighted average fee for all new trades on the most recent business day (in percentage).
HP Index Computed based on the methodology described in Hadlock and Pierce (2010).
ScaledWPS Following Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009), we employ scaled wealth-performance sensitivity to
capture the sensitivity of manager’s wealth to the stock price. It is the dollar change in the CEO’s
wealth for a 100% change in the stock price, scaled by annual pay.
InsiderOwn The fraction of shares held by insiders, such as CEO, CFO, COO, and the president, to total shares
outstanding.
InsiderOwn2 The square of InsiderOwn.
ROE The ratio of net income to book value of equity.
E index The entrenchment index of Bebchuck, Cohen and Ferrell (2009).
G Index The governance index of Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003).
PastStockReturns Compounded daily stock returns over previous year of the merger and acquisition (in logarithm).
High-tech A dummy variable equals one when both acquirer and target are from high-tech industries (from
SDC), and zero otherwise.
RelativeDealSize The ratio of the deal value (from SDC) and the firm’s market value of total assets.
TenderOffer A dummy variable equals one when the deal involves a tender offer, and zero otherwise.
FriendlyDeal A dummy variable equals one when the deal attitude is friendly, and zero otherwise.
FreeCashFlow The difference between operating income before depreciation and the summation of the interest
expense, income taxes, and capital expenditure, scaled by total asset.
NonCashWorking The difference between the current assets and the sum of the current liabilities and cash and cash
equivalents, scaled by total assets.
CashDeal A dummy variable equals one when the pay method is 100% cash.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics: Analysis of mergers and acquisitions
The sample consists of domestic mergers and acquisitions from 2003-2012. CAR(-2,2) is the cumulative
abnormal return calculated using a market model estimated over the period [-210, -11] relative to the an-
nouncement date (day 0). LS is the ratio of the value of shares available for lending to the firm market
capitalization, which covers the period of 2002 to 2011. TotAsset is a logarithm of total assets. PastStockRe-
turn is the compounded daily stock returns over previous year of the merger and acquisition (in logarithm).
ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the book value of assets minus the
book value of equity plus the market value of equity to the book value of total assets. FixedAsset is the ratio
of property, plant, and equipment (PP&E) to sales. R&D is the ratio of R&D expenditure to total assets.
NonCashWorking is the difference between the current assets and the summation of the current liabilities
and cash and cash equivalents, scaled by total assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets.
FreeCashFlow is the difference between operating income before depreciation and the sum of interest ex-
pense, income taxes, and capital expenditure, scaled by total asset. RelativeDealSize is the ratio of the deal
value (from SDC) and the firm’s market value of total assets. FriendDeal is a dummy which equals to one
if the attitude is friendly (SDC), and zero otherwise. High-tech is a dummy variable that equals one when
both acquirer and target are from the high-tech industries (from SDC), and zero otherwise. TenderOffer is a
dummy variable equals one when the deal involves a tender offer, and zero otherwise. CashDeal is a dummy
variable that equals one if the deal is all cash financed, and zero otherwise. IOR is the ratio of institutional
investor ownership to the total shares outstanding. ScaledWPS is the sensitivity of the manager’s wealth to
the stock price, which is measured as the dollar change in the CEO’s wealth for a 100% change in the stock
price, scaled by annual pay. The E index is the entrenchment index of Bebchuck, Cohen and Ferrell (2009).
The G Index is the governance index of Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003). The detailed definitions of these
variables are reported in Appendix B.
N Mean Median Std. Dev
CAR(-2,2) 1018 0.0020 0.0031 0.0741
LS 1018 0.1106 0.0714 0.1222
TotAsset 1018 6.8782 6.8251 1.8304
PastStockReturn 1017 0.0905 0.1307 0.4496
ROA 1018 0.0368 0.0533 0.1616
Tobin’s Q 1018 -1.1029 -0.7570 1.3634
FixedAsset 1018 0.2286 0.1460 0.2197
R&D 1018 0.0416 0.0038 0.0738
NonCashWorking 974 0.2331 0.2102 0.2122
Leverage 1013 0.1902 0.1566 0.1780
FreeCashFlow 1018 0.0294 0.0390 0.1222
RelativeDealSize 1018 0.1772 0.0843 0.2389
FriendlyDeal 1018 0.9882 1.0000 0.1080
High-tech 1018 0.4273 0.0000 0.4949
TenderOffer 1018 0.0766 0.0000 0.2661
CashDeal 1018 0.4008 0.0000 0.4903
IOR 1018 0.6553 0.7321 0.2773
ScaledWPS 541 61.5683 6.6914 642.0740
E Index 375 2.5653 3.0000 1.1283
G Index 327 9.3639 9.0000 2.3807
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Table 3. Summary Statistics: Analysis of abnormal capital investments, firm value, and firm operating performance
Lending Supply (LS) is the ratio of the value of shares available for lending to the firm market capitalization. Abnormal
corporate investment (ACI) is the difference between the current year’s capital investment and the average levels of
capital investment measured over the last three years (Eq.(2)). Firm value is proxied by industry-adjusted Tobin’s
Q, IndAdj Tobin’s Q. This measure refers to the ratio of the market value of assets and the book value of assets,
in which the market value of assets is defined as the difference between the sum of the book value of assets and the
market value of common stock and the sum of the book value of common stock and balance sheet-deferred taxes. It
is also adjusted for the median Q in the same year and in the same two-digit industry. Firm operating performance is
proxied by industry-adjusted ROA, IndAdj ROA. This measure refers to the ratio of net income to the total assets,
after subtracting the median ROA in the same year and within the same two-digit industry classification. IOR is the
ratio of the institutional ownership to total shares outstanding. TotAsset is the logarithm of total assets. BM is the
logarithm of the book-to-market ratio. CashFlow is the sum of income before extraordinary items and depreciation
and amortization, scaled by total assets. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the book value of assets minus the book value of
equity plus market value of equity to the book value of total assets. ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets.
SalesGrowth refers to the changes in sales scaled by lagged sales. Leverage is the ratio of long term debt to total
assets. The HP Index is computed based on the methodology described in Hadlock and Pierce (2010). ScalesWPS is
the dollar change in the CEO’s wealth for a 100% change in the stock price, scaled by annual pay (Edmans, Gabaix,
and Landier (2009)). Sale is the logarithm of sales. Age is derived from the date the companies total asset data first
appeared in Compustat (in logarithm). R&D is the ratio of R&D expenditures to total assets. FixedAsset is the ratio
of PP&E and total sales. Cash is logarithm of cash. InsiderOwn is the fraction of shares held by insiders, such as the
CEO, CFO, CO and the president, to total shares outstanding. InsiderOwn2 is the square of InsiderOwn. ROE is the
ratio of net income to book value of equity. MktSize is the logarithm of market capitalization. Dividend is the ratio
of dividends paid to the book value of equity. Capx is the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets. The E Index
is the entrenchment index of Bebchuk et al. (2009). The G Index is the governance index of Gompers et al. (2003).
Detailed definitions of these variables are reported in Appendix B.
Variables N Mean Median Std. Dev
LS 24930 0.1110 0.0648 0.1420
ACI 24291 0.0565 -0.1010 0.7997
IndAdj Tobin’s Q 23867 -0.3858 -0.4563 1.3419
IndAdj ROA 24706 -0.049 0.0000 0.2103
IOR 24995 0.5768 0.6255 0.3016
TotalAsset 24995 6.2558 6.1942 2.0235
BM 24925 -0.7856 -0.7089 0.8617
CashFlow 24959 0.0239 0.0722 0.2149
Tobin’s Q 24991 1.9447 1.4990 1.3299
ROA 24995 -0.0166 0.0360 0.2184
SalesGrowth 24702 0.1560 0.0839 0.4473
Leverage 24888 0.1863 0.1428 0.1904
HP Index 23496 -7.1846 -6.7695 2.9006
ScaledWPS (in thousands) 11581 0.0280 0.0065 0.0856
Sale 23682 6.0795 6.1532 2.1099
Age 23825 2.6486 2.6391 0.8769
R&D 23686 0.0043 0.0000 0.0284
FixedAsset 23672 0.8672 0.3750 1.5271
Cash 23868 0.3734 0.0596 1.1243
InsiderOwn 23862 0.0629 0.0178 0.1106
InsiderOwn2 23862 0.0162 0.0003 0.0563
ROE 23870 0.0376 0.0880 0.3955
MktSize 24407 6.2297 6.2425 2.0045
Dividend 24665 0.0237 0.0000 0.4367
Capx 24680 0.0472 0.0287 0.0568
E-Index 7565 2.4726 3.0000 1.2505
G-Index 7678 9.0619 9.0000 2.6278
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Table 4. Lending Supply and Subsequent Abnormal Capital Investment
This table reports the regression results for Eq.(3). The dependent variable is ACI, which is the difference between
the current year’s capital investment and the average levels of capital investment measured over the last three years
(Eq.(2)). LS is the ratio of the value of shares available for lending to the firm’s market capitalization, which covers
the period from 2002 to 2011. IOR is the ratio of institutional ownership to the total shares outstanding. TotAsset is
the logarithm of total asset. BM is the logarithm of the book-to-market ratio. CashFlow is the sum of income before
extraordinary items and depreciation and amortization, scaled by total assets. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of market value
of assets and the book value of assets. ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets. SaleGrowth is the change in
sales scaled by lagged sales. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. The E Index is the entrenchment
index of Bebchuk et al. (2009). The G Index is the governance index of Gompers et al. (2003). Detailed definitions
of these variables are reported in Appendix B. All regressions control for year and firm fixed effects, whose coefficient
estimates are suppressed. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are clustered at the firm level. t-values are in
parentheses. *,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Subsequent Abnormal Capital Investment (ACI)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
LS -0.2392 -0.2261 -0.2276 -0.2282 -0.2334 -0.2371 -0.2367 -0.2370 -0.2234 -0.2521 -0.2147
(3.85)*** (3.61)*** (3.63)*** (3.64)*** (3.73)*** (3.79)*** (3.78)*** (3.79)*** (3.57)*** (2.50)** (2.30)**
IOR 0.3351 0.5130 0.5140 0.5037 0.4898 0.4902 0.4902 0.4466 0.3139 0.2115
(4.20)*** (6.17)*** (6.16)*** (6.10)*** (5.90)*** (5.91)*** (5.91)*** (5.35)*** (2.36)** (1.69)*
TotAsset -0.1827 -0.1827 -0.1597 -0.1424 -0.1428 -0.1428 -0.1220 -0.2205 -0.2353
(6.50)*** (6.49)*** (5.71)*** (4.98)*** (5.00)*** (5.00)*** (4.23)*** (5.31)*** (5.73)***
BM 0.0026 -0.0147 0.0176 0.0185 0.0185 0.0162 -0.1468 -0.1390
(0.18) (0.94) (0.93) (0.97) (0.97) (0.85) (5.43)*** (5.09)***
Cash Flow -0.1810 -0.1590 -0.1727 -0.1730 -0.2164 -0.4408 -0.1186
(2.39)** (2.09)** (2.27)** (2.27)** (2.84)*** (1.15) (0.26)
Tobin’s Q 0.0397 0.0404 0.0404 0.0343 0.0173 0.0143
(2.59)*** (2.63)*** (2.63)*** (2.23)** (0.96) (0.76)
ROA 0.0136 0.0136 0.0124 0.1345 -0.2662
(3.24)*** (3.24)*** (3.51)*** (0.40) (0.62)
SaleGrowth 0.0002 0.0002 0.1563 0.1664
(0.42) (0.43) (3.56)*** (3.62)***
Leverage -0.5625 -0.4789 -0.6274
(5.75)*** (3.21)*** (4.08)***
E Index 0.0137
(0.53)
G Index 0.0204
(1.20)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. 22645 22645 22645 22645 22645 22645 22645 22645 22645 7375 7494
R2 0.2481 0.2494 0.2532 0.2532 0.2547 0.2554 0.2554 0.2555 0.2583 0.3576 0.3311
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Table 5. Summary Statistics: Analysis for hazard model
This table reports descriptive statistics for sample firms in the hazard model test. The Investment/Asset
measure used for the hazard estimation is the calculated as (data30-data107)/data6. Lending Supply (LS) is
the ratio of the value of shares available for lending to the firm’s market capitalization. Leverage is the ratio
of long term debt to total assets. CashFlow is the sum of income before extraordinary items and depreciation
and amortization, scaled by total assets. SaleGrowth is the changes in sales scaled by lagged sales. TotAsset
is the logarithm of total assets. A firm is included if its real assets are below the 33rd percentile of the real
assets of the firms in the first year that the firm appears in our sample. Avg. spell length measures the average
number of years that the firm’s investment rate does not go beyond the pre-defined investment threshold.
We employ two times the firm’s median investment rate as the investment trigger. Fraction censored refers
to the percentage of right censored spells in the sample. Length censored (uncensored) refers to the number
of censored (uncensored) years in which a firm remains inactive.
N Mean Median Std. Dev
Panel A: Firm Characteristics
Investment/Asset 4319 0.0388 0.0200 0.0666
LS 4506 0.0602 0.0415 0.0624
Leverage 4505 0.1045 0.0542 0.1284
CashFlow 4507 -0.0472 0.0422 0.2626
SalesGrowth 4498 0.2764 0.1214 0.7070
TotAsset 4507 3.7855 3.8964 1.0073
Panel B: Spell Characteristics
Avg. spell length 1219 3.4807 3.0000 2.2210
Fraction censored 1219 0.5193 0 0
Length censored 633 4.6951 4.0000 2.1781
Length uncensored 586 2.6177 2.0000 1.8297
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Table 6. Semi-parametric hazard model estimates: effects of Lending Supply (LS)
Following Whited (2006) and Billet et al. (2011), we include firms whose real assets are below the 33rd
percentile of the real assets in the first year that the firm appears in sample. The Investment/Asset measure
used for the hazard estimation is the calculated as (data30-data107)/data6. LS is the ratio of the value of
shares available for lending to the firm market capitalization, which covers the period from 2002 to 2011.
Leverage is the ratio of long term debt and total asset. SalesGrowth is the changes in sales scaled by lagged
sales. CashFlow is the sum of income before extraordinary items and depreciation and amortization, scaled
by total assets. TotAsset is the logarithm of total assets. A spike is defined as an investment rate exceeding
a threshold, and the thresholds are pre-defined as 2 and 2.5 times the firm median investment rate (or
firms’ industry’s median contemporaneous investment rate). The number of years since the last spike is also
included, although coefficients are omitted. t-values are in parentheses. *,**, and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Firm Industry
(1) 2 times (2) 2.5 times (3) 2 times (4) 2.5 times
LS -0.6855 -0.7959 -0.2290 -0.2006
(7.93)*** (7.18)*** (4.28)*** (4.45)***
Leverage -1.5821 -1.7582 0.4493 0.1618
(3.69)*** (3.45)*** (1.28) (0.52)
SalesGrowth 0.1802 0.1558 0.0526 0.0344
(3.34)*** (3.70)*** (1.05) (0.71)
CashFlow -0.2329 -0.2247 1.2772 1.0472
(1.25) (1.08) (5.90)*** (5.74)***
TotAsset 0.0022 -0.1037 0.0174 0.0383
(0.04) (1.57) (0.34) (0.84)
obs 4495 4498 4498 4494
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
log likelihood -1575.49 -1240.28 -2104.28 -1782.66
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Table 8. Lending Supply (LS) and the Subsequent firm operating performance
The dependent variable is firm operating performance, which is proxied by IndAdj ROA. It is the ratio of net income
to the total assets, and subtracting the median ROA in the same year and in the same two-digit industry classification.
LS is the ratio of the value of shares available for lending to firm market capitalization over the 2002–2011 period.
BM is the logarithm of the ratio of the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity. IOR the ratio
of institutional investors’ ownership to the total shares outstanding. Size is the logarithm of market capitalization.
LagROA is the lagged industry-adjusted ROA to account for serial dependence in the variable. Capx is the ratio of
capital expenditures to total assets. Leverage is long-term debt scaled by total assets. Dividend is the ratio of dividends
paid to the book value of equity. The E Index is the entrenchment index of Bebchuk et al. (2009). The G Index
is the governance index of Gompers et al. (2003). Detailed definitions of these variables are reported in Appendix
B. All regressions control for year and firm fixed effects, whose coefficient estimates are omitted. Heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors are clustered at the firm level. t-values are in parentheses. *,**, and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Subsequent Firm Operating Performance (ROA)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
LS 0.0081 0.0121 0.0118 0.0153 0.0155 0.0165 0.0164 0.0251 0.0281
(1.09) (1.64) (1.60) (2.07)** (2.08)** (2.22)** (2.21)** (3.01)*** (2.89)***
BM -0.0444 -0.0448 -0.0451 -0.0470 -0.0471 -0.0490 -0.0488 -0.0426 -0.0431
(14.81)*** (15.07)*** (11.70)*** (11.68)*** (11.68)*** (11.86)*** (11.64)*** (8.93)*** (9.16)***
IOR -0.0356 -0.0350 -0.0352 -0.0351 -0.0333 -0.0332 -0.0573 -0.0620
(3.39)*** (3.29)*** (3.39)*** (3.39)*** (3.19)*** (3.19)*** (3.58)*** (3.80)***
Size -0.0005 -0.0047 -0.0046 -0.0066 -0.0066 -0.0021 -0.0002
(0.15) (1.21) (1.18) (1.65)* (1.62) (0.44) (0.05)
LagROA 0.0630 0.0629 0.0619 0.0618 0.0001 0.0049
(2.67)*** (2.67)*** (2.63)*** (2.63)*** (0.00) (0.17)
Capx -0.0099 -0.0133 -0.0133 0.0134 0.0132
(0.30) (0.40) (0.40) (0.35) (0.35)
Leverage -0.0384 -0.0386 -0.0323 -0.0350
(2.62)*** (2.63)*** (2.11)** (2.24)**
Dividend 0.0087 -0.0451 -0.0290
(0.48) (1.02) (0.58)
E index -0.0006
(0.19)
G Index 0.0004
(0.20)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. 24320 24320 24320 24320 24273 24264 24264 6933 7543
R2 0.7214 0.7218 0.7218 0.7242 0.7242 0.7244 0.7244 0.6219 0.6202
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Table 9. The impact of Regulation SHO on the governance effect of lending supply
This table presents the impact of the changes in short-selling regulation on the governance effect of lending supply
(LS) on CAR(-2,2), ACI, Tobin’s Q and ROA. The Regulation SHO is announced by SEC in 2004. The SEC randomly
selects a sample of Russell 3000 index firms as treated securities and formally removes their price restrictions for short
selling on January, 3, 2005. We employ Eq.(7), and report the results in this table. The sample is from 2002 till
the end of the PILOT program (2007). Treated is a dummy variable that equals to one for firms that are selected
as Regulation SHO treated stock, and zero for the remaining Russell 3000 index members. PILOT is a time dummy
variable that equals one from 2005 to 2007 and zero from 2002 to 2004. In column (1), the dependent variable is the 5-
day cumulative abnormal stock returns (CAR (-2,2)) of acquiring firms for the mergers and acquisition announcements
in the subsequent year. CAR (-2,2) is the cumulative abnormal return calculated using a market model estimated
over the period [-210, -11] relative to the announcement date (day 0). We include the same control variables used
in column (14) of Table 2 but their coefficients are not reported. In column (2), the dependent variable is abnormal
capital investment, which is the difference between the current year’s capital investment and the average levels of
capital investment measured over the last three years (Eq.(2)). We include the same control variables used in column
(9) of Table 4 but their coefficients are not reported. In column (3), the dependent variable is the industry-adjusted
Tobin’s Q in the subsequent year. We include the same control variables used in column (12) of Table 7 but their
coefficients are not reported. In column (4), the dependent variable is the industry-adjusted ROA in the subsequent
year. We include the same control variables used in column (7) of Table 8 but their coefficients are not reported.
LS is the ratio of the value of shares available for lending to firm market capitalization. Detailed definitions of these
variables are reported in Appendix B. The table with complete coefficients are presented in Internet Appendix, which
is available upon request. In all specifications, we control for year fixed effects. We do not control for firm-fixed effects
owing to a collinearity with Treated dummy. Standard errors are two-way clustered by both firm and year (Petersen
(2009)). t-values are in parentheses. *,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively.
(1) CAR (-2,2) (2) ACI (3) Tobin’s Q (4) ROA
LS 0.2515 -2.8607 3.0111 0.1931
(1.90)* (2.87)*** (4.37)*** (5.14)***
LS × Treated × PILOT 2.3854 -2.2159 1.2762 0.5355
(4.43)*** (2.80)*** (1.82)* (2.13)**
LS × Treated -2.5459 2.0787 -1.0825 -0.4922
(4.97)*** (4.56)*** (1.40) (1.99)**
LS × PILOT -0.3020 2.5079 -2.8792 -0.1983
(3.13)*** (2.54)** (4.45)*** (4.77)***
Treated × PILOT -0.0061 0.0651 -0.0345 -0.0058
(0.20) (1.83)* (0.48) (1.42)
Treated 0.0539 -0.0434 0.0683 -0.0007
(2.62)*** (2.82)*** (1.41) (1.23)
PILOT -0.0048 0.1967 -0.0595 0.0072
(0.67) (5.57)*** (0.73) (0.87)
Control Variables Y Y Y Y
Year Dummies Y Y Y Y
Obs. 456 7725 6995 7995
R2 0.1222 0.0442 0.2955 0.4973
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Table 10. Re-estimation of main regressions with residual LS
This table presents the results using residual LS to re-test our major regression models. Residual LS is estimated
by regressing LS on contemporaneous firm size, book-to-market ratio, firm age, institutional ownership ratio, and
turnover ratio with firm and year fixed effects included. LS is the ratio of the value of shares available for lending to the
firm’s market capitalization over the 2002–2011 period. In column (1), the dependent variable is the 5-day cumulative
abnormal stock returns (CAR (-2,2)) for acquirer firms in the subsequent year. CAR (-2,2) is the cumulative abnormal
return calculated using a market model estimated over the period [-210, -11] relative to the announcement date (day
0). We include the same control variables used in column (14) of Table 2 but their coefficients are not reported.
In column (2), the dependent variable is abnormal capital investment, which is the difference between the current
year’s capital investment and the average levels of capital investment measured over the last three years (Eq.(2)). We
include the same control variables used in column (9) of Table 4 but their coefficients are not reported. In column
(3), the dependent variable is the industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q in the subsequent year. We include the same control
variables used in column (12) of Table 7 but their coefficients are not reported. In column (4), the dependent variable
is the industry-adjusted ROA in the subsequent year. We include the same control variables used in column (7) of
Table 8 but their coefficients are not reported. Detailed definitions of these variables are reported in Appendix B. The
table with complete coefficients are presented in Internet Appendix, which is available upon request. In column (1),
both industry and year fixed effects are controlled, and standard errors are two-way clustered by both firm and year
(Petersen (2009)). In columns (2), (3) and (4), we control for both year and firm fixed effects, and cluster standard
errors at the firm level. t-values are in parentheses. *,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% level, respectively.
(1) CAR (-2,2) (2) ACI (3) Tobin’s Q (4) ROA
Residual LS 0.0476 -0.1370 0.1516 0.0168
(1.81)* (2.06)** (1.92)* (2.04)**
Firm Charateristics Y Y Y Y
Deal Characteristics Y N N N
Year Dummies Y Y Y Y
Firm Dummies N Y Y Y
Industry Dummies Y N N N
Obs. 915 23298 20978 23595
R2 0.1206 0.2580 0.7206 0.7356
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Table 11. Ruling out the effect of short interest
This table reports the results of using short interest as our main explanatory variable and the results of governance
effect of lending supply after controlling for the effect of short interest. ShortInterest is computed using total value of
stock on loan scaled by market capitalization. In columns (1) and (2), the dependent variable is the 5-day cumulative
abnormal stock returns (CAR (-2,2)) for acquirer firms in the subsequent year. CAR (-2,2) is the cumulative abnormal
return calculated using a market model estimated over the period [-210, -11] relative to the announcement date (day
0). We include the same control variables used in column (14) of Table 2 but their coefficients are not reported. In
columns (3) and (4), the dependent variable is abnormal capital investment, which is the difference between the current
year’s capital investment and the average levels of capital investment measured over the last three years (Eq.(2)). We
include the same control variables used in column (9) of Table 4 but their coefficients are not reported. In columns
(5) and (6), the dependent variable is the industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q in the subsequent year. We include the same
control variables used in column (12) of Table 7 but their coefficients are not reported. In columns (7) and (8), the
dependent variable is the industry-adjusted ROA in the subsequent year. We include the same control variables used
in column (7) of Table 8 but their coefficients are not reported. LS is the ratio of the value of shares available for
lending to firm market capitalization over the 2002–2011 period. Detailed definitions of these variables are reported in
Appendix B. The table with complete coefficients are presented in Internet Appendix, which is available upon request.
In columns (1) and (2), both industry and year fixed effects are controlled, and standard errors are two-way clustered
by both firm and year (Petersen (2009)). In columns (3) - (8), we control for both year and firm fixed effects, and
cluster standard errors at the firm level. t-values are in parentheses. *,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
(1) CAR (2) CAR (3) ACI (4) ACI (5) Tobin’s Q (6) Tobin’s Q (7) ROA (8) ROA
LS 0.0396** -0.2518*** 0.3432*** 0.0512***
(2.41) (2.93) (3.36) (3.66)
ShortInterest 0.0410 0.0103 0.0729 0.1843 -0.4533** -0.9579*** -0.0082 -0.0786**
(0.46) (0.12) (0.48) (1.17) (2.25) (3.78) (0.30) (2.43)
Firm Characteristics Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Deal Characteristics Y Y N N N N N N
Year Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm Dummies N N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry Dummies Y Y N N N N N N
Obs. 973 973 23287 23269 20820 20820 24255 24255
R2 0.1211 0.1221 0.2522 0.2526 0.7167 0.7170 0.7248 0.7252
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Table 12. The impact of ScaledWPS on the governance effect of lending supply
This table reports the results regarding the impact of ScaledWPS on the governance effect of lending supply. Following
Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009), we employ scaled wealth-performance sensitivity to capture the sensitivity of
the manager’s wealth to the stock price (ScaledWPS), which is measured as the dollar change in the CEO’s wealth
caused by a 100% change in the stock price, scaled by annual pay. A firm is defined as a high (low) ScaledWPS firm
if its ScaledWPS is above (below) the 67th (33rd) percentile of the ScaledWPS of the sample. In columns (1) and
(2), the dependent variable is the 5-day cumulative abnormal stock returns (CAR (-2,2)) for acquirer firms in the
subsequent year. CAR (-2,2) is the cumulative abnormal return calculated using a market model estimated over the
period [-210, -11] relative to the announcement date (day 0). We include the same control variables used in column
(14) of Table 2 but their coefficients are not reported. In columns (3) and (4), the dependent variable is abnormal
capital investment, which is the difference between the current year’s capital investment and the average levels of
capital investment measured over the last three years (Eq.(2)). We include the same control variables used in column
(9) of Table 4 but their coefficients are not reported. In columns (5) and (6), the dependent variable is the industry-
adjusted Tobin’s Q in the subsequent year. We include the same control variables used in column (12) of Table 7 but
their coefficients are not reported. In columns (7) and (8), the dependent variable is the industry-adjusted ROA in
the subsequent year. We include the same control variables used in column (7) of Table 8 but their coefficients are not
reported. LS is the ratio of the value of shares available for lending to firm market capitalization over the 2002–2011
period. Detailed definitions of these variables are reported in Appendix B. The table with complete coefficients are
presented in Internet Appendix, which is available upon request. In columns (1) and (2), both industry and year fixed
effects are controlled, and standard errors are two-way clustered by both firm and year (Petersen (2009)). In columns
(3) - (8), we control for both year and firm fixed effects, and cluster standard errors at the firm level. t-values are in
parentheses. *,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Subsamples of ScaledWPS
CAR(-2,2) ACI Tobin’s Q ROA
(1) High (2) Low (3) High (4) Low (5) High (6) Low (7) High (8) Low
LS 0.2299 0.1123 -0.4448 -0.2347 0.5536 0.0306 0.0374 0.0142
(1.80)* (0.97) (2.06)** (1.50) (1.71)* (0.30) (2.12)** (1.25)
Firm Characteristics Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Deal Characteristics Y Y N N N N N N
Year Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm Dummies N N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry Dummies Y Y N N N N N N
Obs. 178 179 3720 3648 3429 3400 3793 3794
R2 0.4181 0.3783 0.4021 0.4241 0.8186 0.7874 0.7323 0.6296
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Table 13. The impact of Peer Hostile Takeover (PHT) on the governance effect of lending supply
This table displays the results of the impact of Peer Hostile Takeover (PHT) on the governance effect of lending
supply. PHT is a dummy variable which equals one if the firm is in an industry (12 Fama-French industries) that
has experienced at least one hostile takeover attempt over last two years. In columns (1) and (2), the dependent
variable is abnormal capital investment, which is the difference between the current year’s capital investment and
the average levels of capital investment measured over the last three years (Eq.(2)). We include the same control
variables used in column (9) of Table 4 but their coefficients are not reported. In columns (3) and (4), the dependent
variable is the industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q in the subsequent year. We include the same control variables used in
column (12) of Table 7 but their coefficients are not reported. In columns (5) and (6), the dependent variable is the
industry-adjusted ROA in the subsequent year. We include the same control variables used in column (7) of Table
8 but their coefficients are not reported. LS is the ratio of the value of shares available for lending to firm market
capitalization over the 2002–2011 period. Detailed definitions of these variables are reported in Appendix B. The table
with complete coefficients are presented in Internet Appendix, which is available upon request. In all regressions, we
control for both year and firm fixed effects, and cluster standard errors at the firm level. t-values are in parentheses.
*,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
The impact of Peer Hostile Takeover
(1) ACI (2) ACI (3) Tobin’s Q (4) Tobin’s Q (5) ROA (6) ROA
LS -0.2234 -0.2117 0.1975 0.1884 0.0164 0.0144
(3.57)*** (3.40)*** (2.43)** (2.32)** (2.21)** (1.88)*
LS×PHT -0.4735 0.7277 0.0331
(1.72)* (2.08)** (1.75)*
PHT 0.1149 -0.0082 -0.0032
(2.33)** (0.11) (0.49)
Control Variables Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
No. 22645 22645 21750 21750 24264 24264
R2 0.2583 0.2587 0.7153 0.7154 0.7244 0.7245
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Table 14. The impact of the payment method of the acquisition deals on the governance effect of lending supply
The dependent variable is CAR(-2,2), which is the cumulative abnormal return calculated using a market model
estimated over the period [-210, -11] relative to the announcement date (day 0). Lending Supply (LS) is the ratio of
the value of shares available for lending to firm market capitalization. AllCashDeal represents those deals that use
100% cash for payment as reported in SDC. NonAllCashDeal refers to the complement sample. Detailed definitions of
these variables are reported in Appendix B. Year dummies and two-digit industry dummies are also used to control for
year and industry effects, while their coefficients are omitted. Following Petersen (2009), standard errors are two-way
clustered by both firm and year. t-values are in parentheses. *,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% level, respectively.
CAR(-2,2)
(1) All Samples (2) NonAllCashDeal (3)AllCashDeal
LS 0.0493 0.1285 -0.0676
(2.15)** (3.31)*** (1.52)
TotAsset -0.0051 -0.0066 -0.0053
(4.88)*** (3.43)*** (2.58)**
PastStockReturn 0.0189 0.0266 0.0120
(2.63)*** (2.79)*** (0.63)
ROA -0.0259 -0.0192 -0.0589
(1.00) (0.68) (1.82)*
Tobin’s Q -0.0009 0.0020 -0.0014
(0.62) (0.63) (0.26)
FixedAsset 0.0555 0.0645 0.0240
(2.29)** (2.38)** (0.65)
R&D -0.1063 -0.0938 -0.0772
(2.32)** (1.30) (0.73)
NonCashWorking 0.0046 0.0071 -0.0021
(0.30) (0.33) (0.07)
Leverage -0.0025 -0.0167 -0.0033
(0.15) (0.65) (0.16)
FreeCashFlow 0.0339 0.0149 0.1864
(0.62) (0.25) (1.75)*
RelativeDealSize -0.0083 -0.0211 0.0398
(0.53) (1.25) (1.05)
FriendlyDeal 0.0131 -0.0049 0.0061
(0.67) (0.16) (0.49)
High-tech 0.0054 0.0134 0.0033
(0.67) (1.46) (0.33)
TenderOffer -0.0025 -0.0127 -0.0032
(0.23) (0.45) (0.37)
CashDeal 0.0077
(1.91)*
IOR 0.0042 -0.0111 0.0372
(0.45) (0.97) (1.99)**
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 968 582 386
R2 0.1116 0.1459 0.2367
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Table 15. The impact of HP Index on the governance effect of lending supply
The HP index is calculated based on the methodology described in Hadlock and Pierce (2010). A firm is defined
as a high (low) HP Index firm if its HP Index is above (below) the 67th (33rd) percentile of the HP Index of the
sample. In columns (1) and (2), the dependent variable is the 5-day cumulative abnormal stock returns (CAR (-2,2))
for acquirer firms in the subsequent year. CAR (-2,2) is the cumulative abnormal return calculated using a market
model estimated over the period [-210, -11] relative to the announcement date (day 0). We include the same control
variables used in column (14) of Table 2 but their coefficients are not reported. In columns (3) and (4), the dependent
variable is abnormal capital investment, which is the difference between the current year’s capital investment and
the average levels of capital investment measured over the last three years (Eq.(2)). We include the same control
variables used in column (9) of Table 4 but their coefficients are not reported. In columns (5) and (6), the dependent
variable is the industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q in the subsequent year. We include the same control variables used in
column (12) of Table 7 but their coefficients are not reported. In columns (7) and (8), the dependent variable is the
industry-adjusted ROA in the subsequent year. We include the same control variables used in column (7) of Table
8 but their coefficients are not reported. LS is the ratio of the value of shares available for lending to firm market
capitalization over the 2002–2011 period. Detailed definitions of these variables are reported in Appendix B. The
table with complete coefficients are presented in Internet Appendix, which is available upon request. In columns (1)
and (2), both industry and year fixed effects are controlled, and standard errors are two-way clustered by both firm
and year (Petersen (2009)). In columns (3) - (8), we control for both year and firm fixed effects, and cluster standard
errors at the firm level. t-values are in parentheses. *,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% level, respectively.
Subsamples of HP Index
CAR(-2,2) ACI Tobin’s Q ROA
(1) High (2) Low (3) High (4) Low (5) High (6) Low (7) High (8) Low
LS -0.0676 0.1285 -0.2542 -0.3607 0.0850 0.2561 0.0086 0.0183
(1.52) (3.31)*** (1.40) (4.41)*** (0.31) (3.00)*** (0.33) (2.39)**
Control Variables Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm Dummies N N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry Dummies Y Y N N N N N N
Obs. 386 582 7473 7473 6924 7374 7957 8032
R2 0.2367 0.1459 0.2845 0.3559 0.7439 0.7275 0.7541 0.5810
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Table A-1. Determinants of Lending Supply (LS)
This table presents the determinants of Lending Supply (LS). LS is the ratio of the value of shares available for lending
to firm market capitalization over the 2002–2011 period. Size is the logarithm of the firm’s market capitalization. BM
is the logarithm of the ratio of the book value of equity to the market value of equity. IOR is the ratio of institutional
investors’ ownership to the total shares outstanding. Age is the date the company’s total assets data first appeared
in COMPUSTAT (in logarithm). Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. InsiderOwn is the fraction of
shares held by insiders, such as CEO, CFO, CO, and president, to total shares outstanding. Idio Vol is the measure
of idiosyncratic volatility based on the Fama French three-factor model. PastRet is the logarithm of compounded
monthly stock returns in the previous year. Illiq is the measure of illiquidity as proposed in Amihud (2002). CashFlow
is the sum of income before extraordinary items and depreciation and amortization, scaled by total assets. Dividend
is the ratio of dividends paid to the book value of equity. R&D is the ratio of R&D to total assets. ROE is the
return on equity. AnalystsCov is the number of analysts covering the firm. AnalystsDisp is the standard deviation
of analysts forecasts scaled by the absolute mean forecasts. Columns (1), (2), and (3) use the contemporaneous LS
as a dependent variable. Columns (4), (5), and (6) use the subsequent LS as dependent variable. Year and two-digit
industry dummies are also used to control for year and industry effects, while their coefficients are omitted. Following
Petersen (2009), standard errors are two-way clustered by both firm and month. t-values are in parentheses. *,**,
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Lending Supply
LSi,t LSi,t−1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Size -0.0166 -0.0270 -0.0463 -0.0041 -0.0111 -0.0245
(2.18)** (2.29)** (2.02)** (0.96) (1.68)* (2.52)**
BM 0.0019 -0.0071 -0.0154 0.0071 0.0009 -0.0035
(0.62) (1.63) (1.49) (2.34)** (0.17) (0.40)
IOR 0.2298 0.2171 0.1459 0.2370 0.2260 0.1775
(3.61)*** (3.72)*** (3.20)*** (5.81)*** (6.07)*** (4.41)***
Age 0.0096 0.0057 0.0040 0.0086 0.0063 0.0087
(3.63)*** (2.35)** (1.60) (1.91)* (1.79)* (1.45)
Leverage 0.0125 -0.0192 -0.0181 -0.0188 -0.0413 -0.0394
(0.55) (1.82)* (1.49) (2.09)** (3.43)*** (2.29)**
InsiderOwn 0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0207 0.0071 0.0046 -0.0159
(0.11) (0.08) (1.06) (0.97) (0.71) (1.18)
Idio Vol -0.0832 -0.1039 0.2048 0.1500 0.1753 1.5059
(0.35) (0.53) (1.05) (0.77) (0.79) (0.90)
PastRet 0.0010 0.0017 0.0045
(0.38) (0.52) (0.84)
Illiq 0.0003 -0.0007 0.0016 -0.0046 -0.0055 -0.0023
(0.19) (0.64) (0.74) (3.77)*** (4.13)*** (2.50)**
CashFlow -0.0507 -0.0157 -0.0206 0.0038
(1.95)* (0.49) (1.65)* (0.19)
Dividend 0.0001 0.0003 0.0016 0.0023
(0.12) (0.31) (2.21)** (2.01)**
R&D 0.0000 0.4495 0.0001 0.1312
(0.00) (1.55) (2.14)** (0.37)
PP&E 0.0049 0.0002 0.0068 0.0037
(0.79) (0.04) (2.12)** (0.60)
ROE -0.0000 -0.0171 -0.0001 -0.0060
(0.54) (1.27) (1.81)* (1.41)
Sale 0.0162 0.0246 0.0118 0.0175
(2.28)** (1.92)* (2.44)** (1.85)*
AnalystsCov 0.0016 -0.0002
(2.09)** (0.30)
AnalystsDisp 0.1305 0.3857
(0.91) (5.66)***
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. 18154 18014 7004 18734 18582 7108
R2 0.5210 0.5355 0.6409 0.4596 0.4759 0.5065
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Table A-2. Semi-parametric hazard model estimates: the effects of ScaledWPS and HP Index
LS is the ratio of the value of shares available for lending to the firm’s market capitalization, which covers
the period from 2002 to 2011. Following Whited (2006) and Billet et al. (2011), we include firms whose real
assets are below the 33rd percentile of the real assets in the first year that the firm appears in the sample.
Following Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009), ScaledWPS is the measure of scaled wealth performance
sensitivity, the dollar change in wealth for a one-percentage-point change in firm value, divided by annual
pay. We construct the HP index by using the methodology described in Hadlock and Pierce (2010). A firm is
defined as a high (low) ScaledWPS firm if its average ScaledWPS is above (below) the 67th (33rd) percentile
of the average ScaledWPS. A firm is defined as a high (low) HP Index firm if its average HP Index is above
(below) the 67th (33rd) percentile of the average HP Index. The Investment/Asset measure used for the
hazard estimation is the calculated as (data30-data107)/data6. SaleGrowth is the changes in sales scaled by
lagged sales. CashFlow is the sum of income before extraordinary items and depreciation and amortization,
scaled by total assets. TotAsset is the logarithm of total assets. A spike is defined as an investment rate
exceeds a threshold, and the threshold is pre-defined in terms of two times the firm median investment rate.
The number of years since the last spike has also been included, although coefficients are omitted. t-values
are in parentheses. *,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Hazard Estimation
ScaledWPS HP Index
(1) High (2) Low (3) High (4) Low
LS -1.4811 -0.7517 -0.3357 -2.0079
(3.24)*** (1.08) (0.82) (4.90)***
Leverage -3.1972 -5.2735 -1.4845 -1.7967
(1.19) (0.57) (1.03) (1.32)
SalesGrowth 3.0355 0.6021 0.5643 0.8081
(1.,98)** (0.18) (1.68)* (0.62)
CashFlow -0.0354 0.4593 -0.6589 4.4938
(0.03) (0.11) (0.80) (1.06)
TotAsset -1.5784 -0.3675 -0.2471 -1.5936
(2.95)*** (0.32) (0.71) (4.30)***
obs 532 462 1088 1551
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
log likelihood -300.78 -178.85 -188.55 -511.11
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Table A-3. The impact of FAS 123R on the governance effect of lending supply
This table contains the results regarding the impact of FAS 123R on governance effect of lending supply. In 2004, the
FASB issued FAS 123R, which is a revised version of FAS 123. FAS 123R requires firms to use the fair value of the
stock options in the income statement, and is effective after June, 2005. Pre-123R is a dummy variable that equals one
from 2002 to 2004, and zero for time during 2006 to 2008. We exclude the year of 2005, as this year is when FAS 123R
was issued by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). In columns (1) and (2), the dependent variable
is the 5-day cumulative abnormal stock returns (CAR (-2,2)) for acquirer firms in the subsequent year. CAR is the
five-day cumulative abnormal return calculated using a market model estimated over the period [-210, -11] relative
to the announcement date (day 0). We include the same control variables used in column (14) of Table 2 but their
coefficients are not reported. In columns (3) and (4), the dependent variable is abnormal capital investment, which
is the difference between the current year’s capital investment and the average levels of capital investment measured
over the last three years (Eq.(2)). We include the same control variables used in column (9) of Table 4 but their
coefficients are not reported. In columns (5) and (6), the dependent variable is the industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q in the
subsequent year. We include the same control variables used in column (12) of Table 7 but their coefficients are not
reported. In columns (7) and (8), the dependent variable is the industry-adjusted ROA in the subsequent year. We
include the same control variables used in column (7) of Table 8 but their coefficients are not reported. LS is the ratio
of the value of shares available for lending to firm market capitalization. Detailed definitions of these variables are
reported in Appendix B. The table with complete coefficients are presented in Internet Appendix, which is available
upon request. In columns (1) and (2), industry and year fixed effects are controlled, and standard errors are two-way
clustered by both firm and year (Petersen (2009)). In columns (3) - (8), we control for firm and year fixed effect and
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are clustered at the firm level. t-values are in parentheses. *,**, and ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
The impact of FAS 123R on governance effect of lending supply
(1) CAR (2) CAR (3) ACI (4) ACI (5) Tobin’s Q (6) Tobin’s Q (7) ROA (8) ROA
LS 0.0512 0.0531 -0.3211 -0.3448 0.2607 0.2653 0.0260 0.0233
(1.75)* (1.84)* (2.92)*** (3.13)*** (2.55)** (2.60)*** (2.55)** (2.26)**
LS × Pre-FAS 0.3724 -1.1834 1.3466 0.0751
(1.68)* (1.99)** (1.00) (2.09)**
Pre-FAS 0.0245 0.0004 -0.4123 -0.0050
(3.52)*** (0.01) (5.02)*** (0.43)
Control Variables Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm Dummies N N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry Dummies Y Y N N N N N N
Obs. 594 594 14561 14561 14602 14602 16299 16299
R2 0.1749 0.1755 0.3384 0.3389 0.7355 0.7355 0.7498 0.7500
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Table A-4. Multivariate DiD test regarding the effects of Regulation SHO on short seller’s lending fees.
This table reports the results of the multivariate difference-in-differences (DiD) test regarding the effects of Regulation
SHO on lending fees. Lending fee is the value-weighted average fee for all new trades on the most recent business day
(in percentage). The sample runs from 2002 until the end of the PILOT program (2007). Treated is a dummy variable
that equals to one for firms that are selected as Regulation SHO treated stock, and zero for the remaining Russell
3000 index members. PILOT is a time dummy that equals one from 2005 to 2007, and zero for years from 2002 to
2004. Size is the logarithm of market capitalization. IOR is the ratio of the institutional investors ownership to total
shares outstanding. Turnover is the ratio of the annual trading volume to total shares outstanding. Age is the date
of the company’s total assets data first appeared in COMPUSTAT (in logarithm). BM is the logarithm of the ratio
of the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity. PastRet is the logarithm of compounded monthly
stock returns in the previous year. In column (2), we control for both year and firm fixed effects, while coefficients
are omitted. Note that the coefficient on Treated is dropped in column (2) because it is correlated with the firm
fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Detailed definitions of these
variables are reported in Appendix B. t-values are in parentheses. *,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Multivariate DiD test of lending fee
(1) (2)
Treated -0.0541
(1.28)
PILOT 0.2118 0.0917
(7.37)*** (1.83)*
PILOT × Treated 0.0215 0.0376
(0.36) (0.65)
Size -0.0720 -0.2943
(4.69)*** (4.87)***
IOR -0.6746 0.2421
(6.16)*** (0.94)
Turnover 0.0813 0.0525
(6.87)*** (2.06)**
Age 0.0182 0.3655
(0.64) (1.64)
BM -0.1212 -0.1121
(2.84)*** (2.11)**
PastRet -0.1686 -0.1266
(6.51)*** (3.96)***
Year Dummies No Yes
Firm Dummies No Yes
Obs. 5467 5467
R2 0.1153 0.6764
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Table A-5. LS improves Tobin’s Q and ROA through disciplining overinvestment
This table provides regression results on whether subsequent ACI is related to the associations between LS, firm value
and operating performance. In columns (1) and (2), the dependent variable is the industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q in
the subsequent year. We include the same control variables used in column (12) of Table 7. In columns (3) and (4),
the dependent variable is the industry-adjusted ROA in the subsequent year. We include the same control variables
used in column (7) of Table 8. Firms that have subsequent ACI being larger (smaller) than the median are included
in columns of (1) and (3) ((2) and (4)). LS is the ratio of the value of shares available for lending to firm market
capitalization over the 2002–2011 period. Detailed definitions of these variables are reported in Appendix B. In all
model specifications, we control for both year and firm fixed effects, and cluster standard errors at the firm level.
t-values are in parentheses. *,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Subsequent Tobin’s Q Dependent Variable: Subsequent ROA
(1) Subsequent ACI (2) Subsequent ACI (3) Subsequent ACI (4) Subsequent ACI
Above Median Below Median Above Median Below Median
LS 0.1872 0.2559 0.0194 0.0475
(1.38) (1.82)* (1.05) (2.15)**
IOR -0.1351 -0.0992 -0.0220 -0.0505
(0.81) (0.51) (1.34) (2.58)**
Size -0.1101 0.0159 -0.0048 -0.0064
(2.72)*** (0.45) (0.77) (1.16)
Leverage -0.7335 -0.3619 -0.0288 -0.0338
(3.42)*** (1.78)* (1.33) (1.36)
ROA 0.0009 0.0905
(0.03) (2.12)**
BM -0.0440 -0.0484
(5.86)*** (7.78)***
Tobin’s Q
R&D -0.3766 -0.3296
(0.21) (0.19)
FixedAsset -0.0520 -0.0718
(1.09) (1.46)
CashFlow -0.3400 -0.0829
(1.38) (0.35)
SaleGrowth
Dividend 0.0499 -0.1750 -0.0167 0.0219
(0.13) (0.35) (0.43) (0.56)
Capx -0.7348 1.0416 0.0101 0.0780
(1.35) (0.96) (0.16) (1.08)
Sale -0.1700 -0.3396
(2.07)** (4.12)***
Age -0.2779 -0.3915
(2.01)** (3.20)***
Cash -0.0544 -0.0757
(1.34) (2.46)**
InsiderOwn 0.4345 0.8678
(0.84) (1.57)
InsiderOwn2 -0.3533 -1.1536
(0.35) (1.02)
ROE 0.0852 0.0384
(0.81) (0.40)
Year Dummies Y Y Y Y
Firm Dummies Y Y Y Y
Obs. 10517 10519 11224 11193
R2 0.7775 0.7644 0.7817 0.7710
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